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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review  
When the subject of Yemen comes up, it’s often through the prism of the terrorist 
threat that is emanating from within its borders. And for good reason: Al-Qaida in 
the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, is al-Qaida’s most active affiliate. It has 
assassinated Yemeni leaders, murdered Yemeni citizens, kidnapped and killed aid 
workers, targeted American interests, encouraged attacks in the United States and 
attempted repeated attacks against U.S. aviation. 
- John O. Brennan, Assistant to President for Homeland Security, August 20121  
 
Since the outbreak of the civil war in Yemen on 22 March 2015, Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) has established itself as a formidable local actor in Yemen. Preceded by a 
violent history of terrorist attacks in Yemen, including the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, 
Al Qaeda affiliates in Saudi Arabia and Yemen merged to establish AQAP in 2009.2 The 
Yemen-based arm of al Qaeda grew to be named the most dangerous Al Qaeda affiliate 
considered a regional threat as well as a threat to the United States homeland in 2011.3 Fueled by 
unrest triggered by the Arab Spring, AQAP weaponized an insurgent force, Ansar al-Sharia, 
seized significant portions of Yemen’s southern governorates, and ruled by Sharia law.4 
However, AQAP lost much of its territory after the newly elected Yemeni President, Abed 
Rabbu Mansour Hadi, launched a counterinsurgency campaign backed by the United States in 
the summer of 2012.5 
The political and humanitarian crises created by the Yemen civil war have allowed 
AQAP to thrive once again. Yemen’s status as a failed state has created a power vacuum in 
                                                
1 W. Andrew Terrill, The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, 2013), 2.  
2 Counter Extremism Project. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Counter Extremism Project, 2.  
3United States Congress, Committee on Homeland Security: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 
“Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 2, 2011 (Washington, District of Columbia: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.  
4 Terrill, The Struggle for Yemen, xi.  




which lawlessness, human rights violations, and extremist groups like AQAP and the Islamic 
State run rampant. The widespread famine, epidemic of cholera, and lack of access to basic 
necessities like food, water, and shelter have rendered Yemeni civilians vulnerable—so 
vulnerable that they must seek out and accept resources from any giver to avoid starvation, 
disease, and further endangerment.6 While the brutal civil war rages between a coalition led by 
Saudi Arabia in support of the Yemeni government and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, AQAP 
has once again seized and established governance in pockets of Yemen’s Abyan, Al-Bayda, 
Hadramawt, and Shabwah governorates.7  
This essay tracks the involvement of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the Yemen 
civil war through the lens of its online propaganda. In order to track AQAP propaganda output 
during the timeframe of the civil war (22 March 2015 to the present), all media posts 
disseminated by AQAP over this five-year period were surveyed in reliance upon Aaron Y. 
Zelin’s “Jihadology” project. Jihadology.net, a clearinghouse for jihadi primary source material 
developed by Zelin, was used to obtain all AQAP media. Zelin retrieves this propaganda from 
the encrypted app Telegram and publishes it online for research purposes.  
This study is dependent upon Zelin’s discovery of AQAP media on Telegram and his 
reposting of that propaganda via Jihadology.net. Limitations must be observed regarding his 
ability to find all AQAP media, as well as the timeliness with which he reposts the material. 
Additionally, the author has very minimal familiarity with the Arabic language and is a Western 
viewer, two traits that inherently limit the author’s ability to interpret media intended not only for 
an Arabic-speaking and Middle Eastern audience, but a Yemeni audience. However, this study is 
                                                
6 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Yemen,” Central Intelligence Agency, Last Updated March 
16, 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html.  




designed to analyze the visuals portrayed by AQAP – the imagery and narratives used to 
persuade viewers. Therefore, the author has focused on an investigation of the visual methods 
AQAP uses, rather than the audio or subtitles, in an attempt to identify the audience AQAP seeks 
to address and the purpose of their persuasion.  
AQAP posted upwards of 526 separate pieces of media between 22 March 2015 and 
February 2020 including video messages, audio nashids (acapella, vocal chants without 
accompanying music that often overlaid with jihadist propaganda), and online statements 
published in PDF format. In attempt to focus on the persuasive effect of moving image, only 
video messages posted produced by AQAP were surveyed. Audio nashids were considered 
outside the parameters of this survey as, though they are often paired with an accompanying still-
image graphic that serves as a frontispiece while the audio plays, there is no visual sequence to 
the media posts. In addition, online statements were not surveyed further for their lack of visual 
appeal.  
The resulting cache of AQAP video messages published from the start of the civil war in 
Yemen until February 2020 totaled 256 videos: one posted in 2020, 20 in 2019, 44 in 2018, 74 in 
2017, 56 in 2016, and 61 in 2015 following March 22, 2015. Then, a random survey of roughly 
one third of the 256 video dataset was completed in order to establish categories into which 
videos could be sorted. The distinct categories which appeared from this initial sample are as 
follows: the insurgency of Ansar al-Sharia, local public services, recorded sermons, espionage, 
and competition with the Islamic State wilayat in Yemen (ISY). 
Examining this cache of AQAP video propaganda from the outbreak of the civil war in 
Yemen from March 2015 to the present, this paper investigates how and why AQAP has 




tactics to gain strength from the desperation caused by the hostilities that target civilians, the 
country’s resulting humanitarian crises, and the complete lack of governmental authority. The 
evidence gleaned from AQAP video propaganda signals two interconnected turning points in 
AQAP’s relations with the Yemeni population and its recruitment strategy.  
First, AQAP’s propaganda throughout the civil war has prioritized appeals to a different 
population than its traditional audience of Westerners and military-aged males.8 AQAP seeks to 
appeal to the average Yemeni civilian, families, and individuals who would normally be 
uninterested in aligning with Al Qaeda but must do so for protection or access to food, water, 
health care, and shelter. Because of its infamous history as a threat to the United States, its media 
products designed for a Western audience, and its affiliation with Al Qaeda senior leadership, 
AQAP has been historically recognized for its Western focus and Western recruiting.9 And 
indeed, under the leadership of the Yemeni-American imam and master propagandist Anwar al-
Awlaki, AQAP’s western focus succeeded in radicalizing Americans well-beyond his death in 
2011; his videos are thought to have helped radicalize many in the United States, including the 
attackers of the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, the attack on Charlie Hebdo in 2015, the 
May 2015 attack in Garland, Texas, the December 2015 San Bernardino shootings, and the 2016 
Orlando shootings.10 The West thinks of AQAP as it does Al Qaeda senior leadership: in relation 
to its ability to strike the homeland. However, the domestic focus present in AQAP’s propaganda 
is evidence of a significant change in preference towards governance and local recruiting—a 
strategy that does not match Al Qaeda senior leaderships’ Western focus and prioritization.11 
                                                
8 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 102-104.  
9 This is particularly evident from the survey of research performed to gain background information on AQAP. 
Western scholars tend to discuss AQAP’s track record of attacks against the West and international aims first, only 
briefly mentioning its local activities and regional influence. 
10 “Anwar al-Awlaki,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/anwar-al-awlaki.  




Second, AQAP has radically changed its approach to governance in the territories it 
controls, no longer brutally implementing Sharia law as it did in 2012, but establishing itself as a 
benevolent lawgiver prioritizing protection and public services. The AQAP that emerged in 
Yemen in 2011 appears almost as early precursor to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, 
bypassing Al Qaeda senior leadership’s warnings against a premature establishment of a 
caliphate and harsh governance.12 AQAP’s cruel punishments were so damaging, in fact, that 
Yemeni citizens fought alongside the Yemeni military in order to force AQAP from its 
controlled governorates in late 2012.13 Drastically changing its past strategy, AQAP carefully 
approaches tribal areas and southern governorates, working to build trust with the local 
population. It seizes control not by ruthless force, but by establishing itself as a more-capable 
overseer than the Yemeni government through showcasing its access to resources and 
completing public services.14  
This research ultimately seeks to answer several questions: Why does research on AQAP 
in Yemen matter? Why should policymakers care about an Al Qaeda affiliate in the age of the 
Islamic State? Finally, why should Western nations care about what is happening to the populace 
of Yemen? AQAP should not be written off as a small Al Qaeda affiliate with severely weakened 
international capabilities due to America’s aggressive counterterrorism campaign. Instead, 
AQAP must be considered a local actor: an insurgent force intent upon using the chaos of the 
Yemen civil war to retake its territory, weaponize the Yemeni population, and expand its 
regional influence. This transformed local strategy ensures that AQAP will be resilient in 
resisting American counterterrorism measures in Yemen. It allows members of AQAP to hide 
                                                
12 Lahoud et al., “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point 
(West Point, NY: Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3, 2012), 29. 
13 Terrill, The Struggle for Yemen, x.  




camouflaged within tribal areas and governorates without contest from the Yemeni government. 
Further, it complicates American counterterrorism operations in Yemen, as drone strikes and 
Special Operations Forces missions may inevitably have trouble discerning between AQAP 
members and Yemeni civilians. 
It is this local strategy that has allowed AQAP to “retain the upper hand” in its 
competition with the Islamic State’s Yemen wilayat (ISY) since its declaration in 2014.15 The 
reformed strategies of AQAP paint it as a direct foil to the Islamic State’s brutal measures and 
public attacks, alienating a Yemeni population that is already wary of attacks on all sides due to 
the civil war. While AQAP operates out of several Yemeni governorates and has staged multiple 
jailbreaks and robberies garnering national attention, ISY has reportedly never held territory in 
Yemen, and it struggles to successfully recruit.16 While AQAP has longstanding ties in Yemen 
and is fluent in the intricacies of tribal politics, ISY’s nascent development in Yemen and its 
fighters’ foreign accents and uniforms are undoubtedly off-putting to a Yemeni audience 
normalized to AQAP.17 And despite a significant disparity in propaganda quality between ISY’s 
slick, professional graphics and AQAP’s traditional, almost amateur in comparison media, 
AQAP’s local ties have allowed it to edge out an internationally-infamous group like the Islamic 
State in recruiting. In perhaps one of the only cases in the world, an Al Qaeda affiliate group has 
seriously competed, and even achieved the advantage, against the Islamic State.  
Literature Review 
                                                
15 The Islamic State’s Yemen wilayat was established after IS Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi accepted an oath of 
allegiance from “Yemen’s mujahidin” in an audio recording. See Elizabeth Kendall, “The Failing Islamic State 
Within the Failed State of Yemen,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 1 (February 2019): 77-86. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26590510.  
16 Kendall, “The Failing Islamic State Within the Failed State of Yemen,” 78.  




 An outlier in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen’s history is rife with limited governance, 
fragmentation, poverty, and internal chaos. In The Ottoman Age of Exploration, Giancarlo 
Casale’s discussion of Ottomans’ repeated attempts to add Yemen to its empire describes the 
initial conquest of Sana’a in 1538 and the revolt in 1574 that would end the first Ottoman 
occupation.18 His account illustrates the perception of 16th century Yemen through primary 
documents, as he includes a quote from Hadim Suleiman Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt 
that would invade Sana’a, describing Yemen as “a land with no lord, an empty province. It 
would be not only possible but easy to capture.”19 Despite this account, Casale reveals the 
Ottomans’ struggle to maintain control in Yemen, particularly in its northern highlands 
dominated by the Zaydi tribes (the ancestors of the Houthis), and the empire’s eventual ousting 
in 1574.20  
 Yemen-expert Paul Dresch describes Yemen’s tumultuous history in A History of 
Modern Yemen, beginning with Ottoman recapture of northern Yemen in the 1830s and the 
British protectorate established around the port of Aden.21 His account of the civil wars 
throughout the twentieth century is essential in understanding the historic strife between north 
and south Yemen; this continues to be a violently divisive political and sociological factor in 
Yemen’s culture, and one on which Al Qaeda has capitalized.22 Tracing the roots of the Houthi 
conflict, Marieke Brand’s research also describes a longstanding division in Yemen, the 
grievance of the Houthis, which has inspired multiple revolutions and the subsequent brutal civil 
                                                
18 Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 42-44. See pages 
89-93 for the revolt of 1574.  
19 Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration, 43.  
20 Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration, 43-44 and 89-93.  
21 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2-3. 
22 See Dresch’s Chapters Four “Revolutions and Civil Wars: the 1960s” (pages 89-118) and Five “Two Yemeni 




war since 2014.23 Brand describes the complexities of Yemen’s tribal network from an 
anthropological perspective, assessing the start of perceived marginalization and alienation of the 
Zaydi Shia tribes under the northern Republican state as early as the 1960s.24 Her discussion of 
the Zaydi revival under Husayn al-Houthi is unmatched, and her analysis of this as transgressing 
beyond a sectarian movement does well to explain the ongoing violence Yemen experiences in 
its current civil war.25  
 Due to the ongoing nature of the civil war in Yemen, the majority of literature describing 
the events of the conflict are available online and updated as events occur. Congressional 
Research Service analyst Jeremy Sharp has published periodic summaries of the civil war from 
its start in March 2015.26 His subsequent body of research tracks the Houthi insurgency, the 
involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran and their transformation of the conflict into a proxy war, 
and the humanitarian concerns of the Yemeni people. In every update published by Sharp, 
AQAP is discussed as an actor in the war’s events, either for its launched insurgency in Yemen’s 
south and central provinces, its attacks on Yemeni government forces, its resistance to the United 
States’ aggressive counterterrorism campaigns, or its competition with ISY. In his last update in 
September 2019, Sharp wrote that fighting between the Yemeni government forces and Southern 
Transitional Council (STC), a separatist militia, “has raised some concern that a divided south 
will provide AQAP breathing room to reemerge as a terrorist threat to both Yemen and its 
neighbors.”27 Discussion of this new conflict in southern Yemen is notable in its perceived 
impact on AQAP’s operations and recruitment. Sharp has not previously discussed this conflict, 
                                                
23 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2017), 3. 
24 Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 348.  
25 Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 348-350.  
26 See Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention (Washington, District of Columbia: 
Congressional Research Service, 2019), 1-21. Sharp’s latest update is from September 17, 2019.  




and his analysis of AQAP in the region has not previously suggested any opportunity for major 
resurgence—only that the group continues to play a role in the civil war and reels in the wake of 
American counterterrorism strikes.28 
 The CIA World Factbook: Yemen, as well as updates published by human rights 
watchdogs like Amnesty International, describes the civilian experience during the civil war in 
devastating statistics. The Factbook’s bottom line up front approach and updated figures, having 
been updated in March 2020, provide jarring statistical view of the civil war’s impact, including 
the country’s vast unemployment rate at almost 25%, extremely limited access to drinking water, 
and high susceptibility to major infectious diseases and child malnourishment.29 In contrast, 
Amnesty International’s reports, while populated with statistics, seek to illustrate the human 
experience in Yemen through interviews and personal stories. 30 For example, in its “Yemen 
War: No End in Sight,” Amnesty International includes quotes from Yemeni civilians who 
experienced mortar bombardment by the Houthi insurgency and the testimonies of a child who 
endured a brutal punishment under Sharia law, an amputation, inflicted by AQAP in 2012.31 The 
humanistic approach of Amnesty International, paired with the quantitative facts of the CIA’s 
World Factbook, provide an illustration of the true conditions on the ground for civilians in 
Yemen that is not achieved by news media.   
 Bruce’s Hoffman’s foundational text Inside Terrorism is an essential source in 
understanding terrorism and jihadist motivations.32 Hoffman’s first edition in 2006 has been 
                                                
28 Ibid.  
29 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Yemen.”  
30 Amnesty International, “Yemen War: No End in Sight,” Amnesty International, March 14, 2019, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/ and Amnesty International, Conflict in 
Yemen: Abyan’s Darkest Hour (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2012), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/mde310102012en.pdf, 1-57.  
31 Ibid. See the youth’s testimony in Amnesty International, Conflict in Yemen: Abyan’s Darkest Hour, 19.  




celebrated as filling the void for a single work that traced the evolution of terrorism to its current 
impact on domestic and international security.33 For this project, Hoffman’s third edition 
published in 2017 is most helpful, as it covers the makeover of Al Qaeda since 2001 into an 
arguably “more resilient, amorphous entity.”34 Hoffman’s updated edition includes a deep 
analysis of Osama bin Laden’s micromanagement of Al Qaeda affiliates— his ability to block 
the promotion of Anwar al-Awlaki within AQAP, for example.35 His analysis of Awlaki’s 
application of Islamic history to modern conflicts is valuable in understanding Awlaki’s 
posthumous ability to inspire lone-wolf attacks around the world, as well as the changing nature 
of terrorist media and communications.36 Additionally, Al Qaeda in its Own Words, edited by 
Middle East scholars Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, provides a unique window into the 
psyche of Al Qaeda from the inside using the group’s own discourse translated into English.37 
This book, including excerpts from Osama bin Laden’s personal statements and interviews, 
allows the reader to trace the evolution of Al Qaeda as rooted in Islamic theology and the way in 
which Al Qaeda’s leaders interpreted religious doctrine as a justification for jihad.38 
 Although still regarded as Al Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliate, there is a gaping hole in 
academic literature devoted to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—particularly after its fall in 
late 2012.39 In fact, this research has unearthed the realization that hardly any book has been 
                                                
33 Ibid.  
34 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 283.  
35 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 319.  
36 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 237-241.  
37 Jean-Pierre Milelli and Gilles Kepel, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 1-2.  
38 Milelli and Kepel, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, 4-8.  
39 Many sources name AQAP as al Qaeda’s “most dangerous affiliate.” See Atwan in After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the 
Next Generation, page 18, Byman in Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What 
Everyone Needs to Know, page 141, and the United States Congress, Committee on Homeland Security: 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, “Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the 
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 




published that is entirely devoted to investigating AQAP. Instead, in their investigative primers 
on the global Al Qaeda network, many authors focus a chapter or even a smaller subsection of 
their writing on AQAP. Of these samples, Abdel Bari Atwan’s “Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula” in his After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation offers more detail and in-depth 
analysis of the group than any other source researched for this project in a lush twenty-five 
pages.40 Editor-in-chief of Rai al-Youm, an Arab world digital news website, Atwan gives an 
inside-look into the psyche of Osama bin Laden from his personal interviews with the Al Qaeda 
emir. These details are essential in understanding the deep ties between the bid Laden family and 
Yemen, between bin Laden and the late leaders of AQAP, and the divergence of AQAP from the 
ideology of Al Qaeda’s senior leadership. Further, Atwan showcases an impressive 
understanding of Yemeni culture, and his command Yemen’s intricate web of tribal politics is 
unmatched. No other source, for example, traces the connection between each of the AQAP 
leaders and their family’s home province in explaining the origin of Al Qaeda’s strongholds in 
southern and central Yemen.41 To date, no source has included information about AQAP’s 
reformed approach to insinuating itself into local tribes; while authors hint at a more 
philanthropic approach than AQAP’s harsh imposition of Sharia law in 2012, Atwan describes 
the dawa approach, in which AQAP slowly earns trust in a tribal setting through building 
relationships and paper marketing.42  
 Very few sources provide up to date information on the ongoing operations of AQAP. 
Online sources like the Counter Extremism Project and the Combatting Terrorism Center at West 
Point, which compile information on terrorist groups in unique, profile-like pages with the latest 
                                                
40 Abdel Bari Atwan, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” in After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation. 
(New York: The New Press, 2013), 80-105.  
41 Atwan, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 90.  




updates from media articles and research, have been essential in understanding the aims and 
operations of Al Qaeda as it exists in Yemen in 2020. Michael Horton’s “Fighting the Long War: 
The Evolution of AQAP,” published by the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, traces 
AQAP’s reformed strategy in enmeshing with the local population, providing detailed 
geographical data on AQAP’s governorates otherwise unreported.43 Horton’s article 
compliments this research in that it explains the origins of AQAP’s new focus on thriving off the 
state’s weakness and deepening ties to local communities.44 However, Horton largely attributes 
AQAP’s ability to enmesh in Yemeni tribes to the sectarian aspect of the civil war.45 While 
AQAP undoubtedly has gained support in identifying itself as a protector of Yemen’s Sunni 
population against the Houthi Shia, Horton’s analysis overlooks the humanitarian reality of the 
civil war that shows itself in AQAP’s propaganda—the desperate need for food, water, and 
shelter.  
 Although terrorism expert Daniel Byman’s Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global 
Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know is a foundational text in assessing terrorist 
groups and their ideology, Byman devotes only three pages to AQAP, though he names it first 
among the Al Qaeda affiliates.46 While Byman traces AQAP’s founding from its Saudi and 
Yemeni roots, his take on the group’s operations is limited; he describes the group as conducting 
operations primarily against the Yemeni government, yet focuses almost solely on the group’s 
attempts to radicalize and attack the West.47 However, Byman includes the opinion of Osama bin 
                                                
43 Michael Horton, “Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,” CTC Sentinel 10, 
no. 1 (January 2017): 17-23, https://ctc.usma.edu/fighting-the-long-war-the-evolution-of-al-qaida-in-the-arabian-
peninsula/.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Horton, “Fighting the Long War,” 20.  
46 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 142-44.  




Laden, reportedly thinking of AQAP as “inexperienced, prone to mistakes, and too focused on 
Yemen.”48 Many sources note the ties between the bin Laden family (and much of Al Qaeda 
senior leadership) and AQAP, but few sources record the discrepancy between these close ties 
and bin Laden’s true ideological opinion of AQAP’s operating style. Similarly, Rohan 
Gunaranta’s Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror covers AQAP in little more than two 
pages.49 Gunaranta’s profile of terrorism in Yemen is brief. His book’s publishing in 2001 
predates the AQAP merger, yet this provides a detailed glimpse into Al Qaeda’s aims and 
operations in Yemen prior to September 11, 2001.50 His summary does well to describe Al 
Qaeda from a jihadist perspective. For example, he notes that Yemen has been a strategic interest 
of Al Qaeda’s for decades due to only 35% of its territory being under government control, as 
well as its close proximity to the Horn of Africa, where American troops were once stationed in 
Somalia and Ethiopia.51  
 In conducting this research, several sources published before the outbreak of the Yemen 
civil war in 2015 have proven vital in building a background to understand the messages in 
AQAP’s propaganda. W. Andrew Terrill’s master’s thesis completed in the Strategic Studies 
Institute and U.S. Army War College, The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula, has been essential in understanding AQAP’s rise in the wake of the Arab 
Spring and its governance under Sharia law.52 Although Terrill covers AQAP’s loss of territory 
in 2012, he outlines the conditions under which AQAP might resurge and regain its influence—
conditions which have occurred since his thesis’ publishing in 2013. Additionally, government 
                                                
48 Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement, 143.  
49 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 
139-141.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 140.  




transcriptions like those of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security do 
well to represent the American concern with AQAP, climaxing in 2011 as “the most significant 
threat to the homeland.”53  
 The strategy of persuasion using a visual image is a centuries-old tactic, one that can be 
traced back to the ancient rulers such as Alexander the Great who sought to cement his rule 
through visual connections to divinities. In his Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda 
from the Ancient World to the Present Era,  communications expert Phillip M. Taylor provides a 
comprehensive history of propaganda, the deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and 
behave in a desired way.54 Taylor’s survey spans propaganda from ancient Mesopotamian war 
steles (circa 2550 B.C.) celebrating military victories, through the ancient Greeks propaganda 
used to inspire citizen soldiers as told by Herodotus, to the spread of Christianity through visual 
imagery in the Middle Ages, Renaissance warfare, the American and French revolutions, and the 
World Wars.55 Taylor’s final section “The World after 11 September 2001” is most helpful, as it 
speaks to the modern era’s “battle of hearts and minds” and propaganda’s evident importance as 
international terrorism grows.56 Taylor writes that “propaganda has proved to be a weapon of no 
less significance than swords or guns or bombs,” agreeing with the jihadist belief that 
recruitment via propaganda teams is as important as waging physical jihad as a fighter.57 The 
majority of Taylor’s modern examples stem from the 1991 Gulf War and American PSYOPS 
                                                
53 See United States Congress, Committee on Homeland Security: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 
Intelligence, “Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 2, 2011 (Washington, District of Columbia: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 1. 
54 Phillip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era, 
Third Edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 6.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 319.  




team strategies in attempt to counter the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan and later Saddam 
Hussein; Taylor predates the rise of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State’s digital media presence.58 
However, his text is foundational in understanding the history of propaganda, and the roots of 
coercion on which Al Qaeda and the Islamic State now draw.  
 In complement to Taylor’s earlier text, Propaganda and Conflict: War, Media, and 
Shaping the Twentieth Century details the propaganda used through the two world wars, Cold 
War, and in the digital age, citing Al Qaeda as the first guerilla movement to exist in physical 
and cyber space.59 Indeed, Al Qaeda has used technology to its advantage, creating a “virtual 
state” into which it draws young recruits with sophisticated videos.60 Taylor’s analysis also 
serves as a counterargument for this research, and that of W. Andrew Terrill and Abdel Bari 
Atwan, as it argues that the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and the events of the Arab 
Spring alienated the Muslim world from Al Qaeda’s fundamentalist propaganda.61 While Atwan 
admits that alienation of local support for Al Qaeda occurred in most Muslim countries, the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 were celebrated in the streets of major cities in Yemen.62 In 
accordance with Terrill’s assessment, the alienation of Yemenis by AQAP can be traced not to 
the Arab Spring, but to AQAP’s forced governance in 2012.63 Nonetheless, Taylor’s discussion 
of use of propaganda in the twentieth century, and his emphasis on how technology has 
revolutionized it into digital media, is invaluable.  
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s propaganda output has been meagerly studied. The 
literature analyzing AQAP’s online propaganda almost solely focuses on Inspire, the 
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60 Ibid.  
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instructional, Western-designed magazine first released online in 2010, and the so-called “Sheikh 
of the Internet,” Anwar al-Awlaki.64 However, if one chooses to forgo Inspire and focus solely 
on AQAP’s video messages, there is much less scholarly work from which to draw. AQAP’s 
online media has received a fraction of the attention given to that of the Islamic State, both in 
assessment of its quality and analysis of its imagery and symbolism. And indeed, some of 
AQAP’s propaganda mirrors that of the traditional Al Qaeda aesthetic – long sermons and slow 
motion training footage considered old hat to the Islamic State’s seamless editing and 
professional aesthetic.  
Investigating the nature of interactions between a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula and Yemeni civilians naturally limits a complete articulation of the 
circumstances on the ground in Yemen. AQAP, in particular, displays a deep paranoia and 
guards its secrets to protect its operational security. This paranoia manifests in the Al Qaeda 
franchise’s propaganda, as it filters almost all of the figures in its videos so that their facial 
features are blurred and warns fighters to be wary of Western “spies.” Therefore, this study relies 
upon the primary content produced and published by AQAP, seeking to understand its visual and 
narrative appeals to a Yemeni audience to better identify its methods of recruitment and 
prioritization of goals. However, as with all propaganda, one must be conscious that the narrative 
presented by this jihadist group cannot be trusted as fact. Terrorist organizations often inflate or 
manipulate narratives to their benefit, and their media products cannot be construed as providing 
an accurate picture of the group’s capabilities. Accordingly, AQAP’s videos have been surveyed 
to identify the audience to which AQAP makes the most appeals, the visual and narrative 
strategies by which the group seeks to recruit followers, and the visual aesthetic AQAP presents 
                                                




as part of its brand. The author accepts that developing an estimate of AQAP’s capabilities from 
study of its online propaganda would likely be inaccurate.  
 Much like the Yemen civil war, jihadism in Yemen is likely to remain a persistent issue. 
The counterterrorism measures authorized by the Obama and Trump Administrations have, 
indeed, weakened AQAP in regards to decapitating leadership networks. In February 2020, the 
United States successfully eliminated one of AQAP’s founders and leaders, Qasim al-Raymi.65 
However, just as it rebounded from its defeat in late 2012, AQAP continues to govern territory 
spanning several Yemeni provinces. Due to AQAP’s current goal of enmeshing its fighters 
within the local community and integrating with tribes, eradication of the group is even farther 
from attainable. As the Yemen civil war only contributes to the unbridled lawlessness, 
corruption, and degrading humanitarian conditions in Yemen, it is evident that the country will 
remain as it has historically been—a safe haven in which jihadists can train, operate, and rebuild. 
  
                                                





Chapter 2: Background 
 
The real battle against the terrorist al Qaeda organization [al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula] has yet to begin and will not end until we have eradicated their 
presence in every district, village, and position; it will not end until internally 
displaced citizens are assured that they can return safely to their homes and 
organized terrorist operatives have surrendered their weapons and rid themselves 
of ideologies that contradict the sacred values of the Islamic religion. 
- President of Yemen Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi, May 201266 
Basic Context  
 Yemen’s geographical importance renders it of particular interest to the United States 
despite its poor infrastructure and enduring conflicts. Its strategic location, sharing a long border 
with Saudi Arabia and giving it control over access to the southern Red Sea via the Bab al-
Mandeb Strait, almost automatically makes it an American interest, and one that cannot be lost to 
terrorists; three million barrels of oil per day move through the strait en route to Western 
markets.67 Indeed, United States Marines are currently stationed on Yemen’s Socotra Island in 
support of Saudi and United Arab Emirates forces on the island, reportedly installing a Patriot 
missile system there.68 Yemen’s relative proximity and connections to African terrorist 
strongholds such as Djibouti and Somalia mark it as of interest to the U.S. counterterrorism 
forces active in the region. The country itself has long been valued as a safe haven for jihadists, 
much like Afghanistan and Pakistan, due to its isolated mountainous terrain, rural population, 
and many distinct tribes.69  
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 Yemen’s history of rarely existing under a single government due to tribal rivalries, 
intervention by foreign proxies, and domestic anarchy has also contributed to the country’s status 
as a haven for groups like Al Qaeda. The Kingdom of Yemen existed historically under the 
leadership of fragmented tribal dynasties until the Ottoman empire turned its gaze north after 
conquering Egypt and swept into Sana’a in the early 16th century.70 The Ottomans reportedly 
found the country as “a land with no lord, an empty province,” and an easy target to capture, yet 
the empire struggled for years to establish a strong presence after meeting tribal opposition.71 For 
instance, the Ottomans failed to interfere with Yemen’s Zaydi Shia minority based in Yemen’s 
northern highlands, the Sa’dah region.72 The Zaydi are followers of a sect of Shia Islam which 
does not fall under the religious patronage of Iran and believes Muslims should be ruled only by 
a descendent of Zayd bin ‘Ali.73 While all Shia believe the lineage of the prophet Muhammed 
should have continued with ‘Ali due to their family connection, the Zaydi specifically trace the 
rightful succession of the imamate to Zayd bin ‘Ali, while most Shia regarded his brother, 
Muhammad al-Baqir, as the fifth Imam.74 Untouched by colonial occupiers, Zaydism flourished 
in Yemen’s highlands, allowing a succession of Zaydi imams to rule northern Yemen for over 
1,000 years (since 893 CE).75 
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 Yemen’s modern history begins with the nation’s division under the British and Ottoman 
empires in the 1830s.76 While the Zaydi Shia imamate in the north remained intact, Britain held 
the sea port of Aden as a protectorate, and the Ottomans were based in Sana’a and the adjoining 
governorate Taiz.77 Following the armistice of 31 October 1918 that preceded the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, the territory under Ottoman rule became independent and united as North 
Yemen.78 This northern state adopted the rule of the surviving Zaydi Shia imamate, and Imam 
Yahya and his successors ruled in North Yemen until 1962.79 The imamate was deposed in 1962 
after growing repression resulted in a military coup d’état.80 In the subsequent civil war, the 
Zaydi imamate was backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan, while the military-led republican 
revolutionaries were backed by Egyptian troops.81 The victorious republican revolutionaries 
renamed the state the Yemen Arab Republic in 1968.82 Meanwhile, growing repression and 
opposition to the British occupation of South Yemen forced the British to withdraw from their 
southern holdings in 1967, allowing for the formation of an adjacent Yemeni state: the People’s 
Republic of Southern Yemen.83  
 Although the two countries unified in 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen, the strife 
between north and south Yemen remains a violently divisive political and sociological factor in 
Yemen’s culture, and one on which Al Qaeda has capitalized.84 Prior to unification, a radical 
wing of the Marxist National Liberation Front defeated a rival faction to control the People’s 
                                                
76 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2-3. 
77 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 3.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2017), 102.  
80 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 89-90.  
81 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 90-92.  
82 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 95.  
83 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Yemen,” Central Intelligence Agency, last Updated 
November 5, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html.  




Republic of Southern Yemen, prompting thousands of Yemenis to defect to North Yemen.85 The 
two Yemeni states actively fought each other from 1972 until the 1990 unification, North Yemen 
backed by Saudi Arabia and the Marxist South Yemen armed by the Soviet Union.86 Conflict 
between the two regions remains ongoing, as a southern secessionist movement was launched in 
1994 in order to establish a new Democratic Republic of Yemen in Aden.87 The movement was 
violently thwarted by then-president of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh (1978-2012), and separatism 
remains sowing deep distrust between Yemen’s southern governorates and Sana’a.88  
 It is impossible to study modern Yemen without analyzing the role of Al Qaeda in 
Yemen and later, AQAP. Al Qaeda in Yemen has been targeting Americans since the 1990s, 
even if it has not always succeeded in these attempts. As early as 1992, the group bombed two 
Aden hotels in a failed attempt to kill American soldiers traveling for station in Somalia, instead 
killing two Australian tourists.89 The country was known for its acceptance of veterans of the 
Soviet-Afghanistan jihad, as President Saleh recruited three brigades of the Islamist veterans to 
fight against the southern provinces threatening succession in the 1994 civil war.90 The bombing 
of the USS Cole in the Port of Aden on 12 October 2000 which killed 17 American sailors 
established Al Qaeda in Yemen as a threat to the United States.91 Yemeni President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh was “grudging” in his support of the American investigation following the bombing, 
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fearing unrest due to the anti-American sentiment in Yemen.92 It was only after the attacks of 11 
September 2001 that Saleh finally began to genuinely fight terrorism in his country, authorizing 
American predator strikes against Al Qaeda for the first time in Yemen’s history.93 
AQAP officially formed on 23 January 2009, merging the Al Qaeda affiliates in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen (AQSA and AQY) under the leadership of Nasir al-Wuhayshi.94 This 
consolidation of power was made possible by a “genesis moment” for the group: the February 
2006 jailbreak from Sana’a prison.95 Suspected to have been orchestrated with inside help, the 
jailbreak allowed twenty-three high-profile Al Qaeda Yemen (AQY) militants including Qasim 
al-Raymi and Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Osama bin Laden’s former secretary, to escape.96 Less than 
two years later, two Saudi nationals with ties to Al Qaeda, Said al-Shihri and Mohamed al-Awfi, 
were transferred from Guantanamo Bay into a Saudi Arabian government-sponsored 
rehabilitation program, the Care Center.97 After being released by the Center in early 2008, both 
men fled to Yemen where they would evidently meet Raymi and Wuhayshi.98 None of the four 
Al Qaeda veterans would surface again until January 2009, when they released an inaugural 
video in which they stood side by side to announce the merger of their two groups under the 
name “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” with aims to establish an Islamic caliphate and 
implement Sharia law.99  
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 From its origin, AQAP has had notably strong ties to Al Qaeda senior leadership. Osama 
bin Laden’s family originated in Yemen’s Hadramaut region, and the Al Qaeda founder 
considered the country as a safe logistical base from which to train recruits and launch 
operations.100 Bin Laden fought in Afghanistan alongside Tariq bin Nasser bin Abdullah al-
Fadhli, a warlord whose family ruled over one of the former British sheikhdoms in southern 
Yemen.101 The founders of AQAP, including former leader Wuhayshi, worked closely with 
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1990s.102 Bin Laden had personally supervised the 
funding of, planning for, and attack on the USS Cole in 2000.103 In 2013, Al Qaeda leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri promoted AQAP’s Wuhayshi as a manager of Al Qaeda’s overall military 
pursuits and propaganda.104  
Civil War in Yemen  
 Yemen’s tribal politics have been a source of deep unrest in the country, with the Houthi 
conflict destabilizing northern Yemen only a few years after the failed southern secession.105 The 
Houthi family are a Zaydi Shia tribe from the Marran Mountains in Yemen’s northern Sa’ada 
region.106 Although the Houthi family is responsible for the origin of the movement, it has 
extended outside of the Houthi clan into a broader tribal alliance to include a majority of 
Yemen’s Zaydi tribes—over 100,000 followers estimated in 2010.107 The 1962-1970 civil war in 
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North Yemen deposed the Zaydi imamate that ruled Yemen’s northern highlands for over a 
millennium, and is the source of the Houthi grievance.108 Zaydis were vehemently opposed to the 
creation of a republic “through the merger of Sunni and Zaydi doctrines to create a unified 
Islam.”109 The subsequent reorganization of society and standardization of religious practices, 
paired with the vilification of Zaydi doctrines, by a republican government that only truly 
supported the spread of radical Sunni Islam, infuriated Zaydi tribes in North Yemen.110 
Observing a sectarian competition between Zaydism and growing radical Sunnism in its 
historical heartland, Zaydis formed a revival movement to combat their marginalization under 
the republican state.111 Following the unification of the two Yemeni states in 1990, President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, a Zaydi Shia Muslim and former president of North Yemen, was installed as the 
first president of a unified Yemen.112 The Zaydi, and later Houthi, allegiance to Saleh stems from 
his system of financial patronage paid to northern Zaydi tribes to pacify their political 
grievances.113  
 Former Zaydi cleric and politician Husayn al-Huthi catalyzed the Zaydi revival with the 
formation of the Houthi movement in 2001.114 Under its ideological shi’ar (the scream), “death 
to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory for Islam,” al-Huthi mobilized Zaydi 
opposition to American foreign policy in the Middle East and Saleh’s pledge to support the War 
on Terror.115 The growing economic and political discrimination Zaydis faced in the Sa’dah 
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region from a newly pro-American and Wahabi-aligned government allowed al-Huthi’s sermons 
to resonate with northern Shia tribal leaders.116 Between 2004 and 2013, the Houthi insurgency 
waged six separate wars against the government of Yemen, seeking to establish an autonomous 
region in Yemen’s northern mountains outside the control of the Saleh government.117 These 
“Sa’dah Wars” allowed the Houthis to develop a seasoned military, as well as win the support of 
Shi’a-majority Iran.118  
 The Houthis declared an independent Shia state after the paralysis of the Yemeni 
government following the 2011 Arab Spring, and adopted a new name, Ansar Allah (Partisans of 
God).119 President Saleh, unpopular for his corrupt reliance on buying support from powerful 
tribes and his thirty-year regime, clung to power through the use of violence, including ordering 
plainclothes snipers to shoot into crowds of demonstrators in Sana’a, which led to the deaths of 
52 protestors.120 After losing the support of over half of Yemen’s military and many tribes, Saleh 
finally signed a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement ordering his resignation in 
November 2011, but not before an additional 2,000 civilians were killed in the upheaval.121 
However, the Houthis remained loyal to President Saleh, believing that the GCC agreement 
ignored their grievances and sought to weaken them politically.122 The alliance with Saleh also 
won the Houthis “entire brigade sets of tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons,” as well as 
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missile and coastal defense forces, still controlled by Saleh loyalists during the government 
transition.123 
 The conflict in Yemen escalated in 2014 as Houthi militants, loyal to former President 
Saleh, seized Sana’a and forced newly elected President Abed Rabbu Mansur Hadi into exile in 
Riyadh.124 Hadi’s weakness left the Yemeni government in jeopardy. In his three years as 
President, Hadi never established a strong political base. While facing opposition from the 
northern Houthis, President Hadi was also widely unpopular in Yemen’s southern provinces after 
having lobbied against the campaign to reestablish southern independence in 1994.125 Hadi faced 
additional internal resistance; Saleh’s policy of rewarding relatives and tribal members with 
government positions left Hadi surrounded by Saleh loyalists sympathetic to the Houthi cause.126 
The result of his removal from office paired with this internal strife triggered a complete 
breakdown of government functions.  
 In March 2015, an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched an air and ground 
offensive against the Houthi rebels in order to restore Hadi’s authority, responding to the Houthi 
capture of Sana’a and promise to invade the south, marking the beginning of the civil war.127 
While the coalition succeeded in retaking Sana’a, it was heavily criticized for its use of cluster 
munitions, indiscriminate targeting, and intentional strikes against civilian areas.128 The United 
States has come under scrutiny for its support of the Saudi-led coalition, which Amnesty 
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International accuses of violating international human rights laws and the laws of war due to its 
bombing of hospitals and schools.129 The coalition is bolstered by American military and 
intelligence support, including precision targeting training, multi-million dollar arms deals, and 
mid-air refueling.130 Hostilities have only ceased for a few weeks at a time, as considerable 
access to destructive weaponry on both sides and competition due to the proxy war continue to 
fuel the bloodshed.131  
 Yemen’s population has been caught in the middle of this devastating conflict; the 
humanitarian crisis in Yemen is the worst in the world, with nearly 22 million of Yemen’s 
population of 28 million in need of basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter.132 Over 
seven million civilians are at risk of famine.133 Because Yemen is not nationally self-sufficient 
and requires food imports to make up almost 90% of its food supply, the Saudi-led coalition’s 
repeated naval and aerial blockades on the country has exacerbated the famine.134 Limited access 
to uncontaminated water and food has resulted in nearly 1 million cases of cholera in Yemen, the 
world’s largest cholera outbreak.135  
 There have been rampant human rights violations committed by both sides. Amnesty 
International reports that indiscriminate and intentional targeting of non-combatants by the 
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coalition has killed 512 civilians – most with American weapons.136 The Houthis are accused of 
responsibility for hundreds of civilian causalities after indiscriminate shelling in residential areas 
such as the city of Taiz, the planting of landmines, and endangering civilians through 
deliberately militarizing hospitals.137 Combined with the rapid inflation of the Yemeni riyal and 
diminishing access to oil and water resources, Yemen’s economy is in shambles.138 Yemen is the 
Middle East’s poorest country, with 54% of its population living below the poverty line.139 Over 
60% of Yemen’s “24 and below” age group is affected by the country’s 29% unemployment, 
making youth particularly susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups.140  
 Although it cloaks its involvement in the civil war with denial and deception, Shia Iran 
has backed the Houthi insurgency, seeking to compete with Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia over 
domination of the Arabian Peninsula. The Houthis are thought to have received training and 
arms from the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designated a 
foreign terrorist organization by the United States.141 Iran has reportedly stationed an 
intelligence-gathering ship in the Red Sea near the Yemeni port of Midi, and arms shipments 
bound for the Houthi insurgency were intercepted at the Midi port as early as 2009 before the 
Houthis’ taking of the port in 2011.142 The U.S.S. Farragut’s interception of Iranian rockets, 
portable defense systems, and materials used to make landmines on a ship bound for Yemen in 
2013 indicates Iran’s arming of the Houthi insurgency.143 Indeed, Houthi ease in the use of 
advanced weaponry similar to Iranian missile systems, such as the adapted Burkan missile 
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capable of striking Riyadh, suggest Iranian technical assistance.144 Yemeni reports have also 
indicated that Houthis have traveled to Iran for training, and that Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah 
trainers were “like a diamond to the Houthis,” having entered Yemen to guide the insurgency 
with tactical and strategic instruction.145 In addition to arms and training, the United Nations 
suspects that the Houthis receive $30 million per month in donations from Iranian shell 
companies.146  
 In an effort to counter Iranian expansionism, the United States provides mid-air refueling, 
intelligence, and targeting training to the Saudi-led coalition.147 While American assistance is 
intended to “emphasize the laws of armed conflict and best practices for reducing civilian 
causalities,” according to previous Secretary of Defense James Mattis, limited “progress” has 
been achieved over four years.148 American arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE have come 
under scrutiny; yet, by the end of the Obama Administration, Saudi Arabia had bought $115 
billion in arms from the United States – including warships, Patriot air-defense systems, and 
tanks.149 Congress passed a $510 million sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia in 
2018 with enthusiastic support from the Trump Administration.150 President Trump, facing 
opposition in the Senate, declared a “national emergency” as a result of tension with Iran in 
Summer 2019 in an effort to sell $8 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan.151 
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These weapons undoubtedly fuel the coalition’s unrelenting bombing campaign, endangering 
Yemeni civilians while playing into anti-American sentiment on which Al Qaeda capitalizes.  
 The conflict has spread to consume the entire country, and new conflicts seem to spark 
every month. For example, the United Arab Emirates deployed its armed forces to Aden in an 
effort to train local militias like the STC, a southern separatist force that opposes Yemen’s 
government due to the inclusion of Yemen’s main Sunni Islamist party, al Islah, in government 
politics.152 In his congressional primer from September 2019, analyst Jeremy Sharp discusses for 
the first time the divisions in southern Yemen from clashes between Yemen’s armed forces and 
the STC.153 Having drastically escalated in the summer of 2019, this conflict may provide AQAP 
“breathing room to reemerge as a terrorist threat both to Yemen and its neighbors.”154 After more 
than four full years of violence and multiple failed attempts at calling ceasefires and 
negotiations, there is no end in sight for the Yemeni civil war. Yemen’s continued status as a 
failed state provides the conditions in which AQAP can hide, rebuild, and return to the 
domineering domestic presence it was from 2011-2012. 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula   
W. Andrew Terrill traces the rise of AQAP in Yemen as a local threat to the Yemeni 
government to January 2011, as President Saleh began to use Yemen’s military for protection 
against demonstrators inspired by the Arab Spring.155 The political upheaval in Yemen triggered 
by the removal of Saleh in 2012 created a power vacuum which AQAP used to amass territory in 
which it could establish governance. By early 2011, AQAP created its insurgent force, Ansar al-
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Sharia, to seize southern Yemen and act as a substitute for the Saleh regime.156 In adopting a 
name that hid the group’s ties to AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia could market itself as focused on local 
concerns, and thus distance itself from AQAP’s identity as an internationally-known terrorist 
organization.157 Emanating out from the city of Ja’ar, Ansar al-Sharia established governance in 
most towns in the southern governorate of Abyan, including the capital, Zinjibar, by June 
2011.158 Terrill writes that the implementation of Sharia Law was so harsh that “no propaganda 
effort was likely to make their rule palatable to independent-minded Yemeni tribesmen.”159 
Indeed, the human rights watchdog Amnesty International reported that the cruel punishments 
inflicted by Ansar al-Sharia’s policing committee upon its captured population included 
beheadings, crucifixions, amputations, and public floggings.160 By April 2012, Ansar al-Sharia 
held most of Abyan, as well as key areas in Shabwa and Al-Bayda governorates.  
 Recognized for its significant local ties, AQAP clearly has a goal of blending into the 
domestic population of Yemen. This is especially notable in contrast to the Islamic State’s 
strategy in Yemen. Sharp writes that AQAP’s propaganda output may be “earthy and primitive, 
but it is more authentic and less foreign” than that of the Islamic State’s Yemen wilayat.161 For 
example, in an effort to mesh with the local population and create breathing space to operate in 
the country, AQAP presents itself as “part of a wider Sunni front against Houthi 
expansionism.”162 This manipulation of civil war politics and local fear of the Houthi insurgency 
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and the Iranian incursion reveals an inter-state focus uncharacteristic of Al Qaeda central’s 
Western-focus. Although AQAP “preserves a public veneer of subordination,” it maintains a 
local strategy and recruitment preference radically different from that of Al Qaeda central.163  
 AQAP’s shift in strategy, particularly the new focus on recruiting local Yemenis in lieu 
of foreign Westerners, may be a direct result of the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki, who died 
in an American drone strike on 30 September 2011. A New-Mexico native, Awlaki was strongly 
fixated on internet advocacy of striking the United States. And, indeed, Awlaki’s legacy of 
radicalizing Westerners to jihad has survived long after his death. The cleric’s sermons and video 
messages have been traced to many high-profile terrorist events: for example, the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombing, the attack on Charlie Hebdo in 2015, the May 2015 attack in Garland, 
Texas, the December 2015 San Bernardino shootings, and the 2016 Orlando shootings.164 The 
Counter Extremism Project has identified 56 homegrown radicals in the United States in which 
“Awlaki’s radicalizing influence was a key factor.”165 In addition, 43 European extremists were 
found to have ties to Anwar al-Awlaki, including a perpetrator of the Brussels bombing which 
killed 32 and wounded over 200 and the London Bridge knife attack.166 However, in terms of 
AQAP’s internal recruitment strategy, the death of such a dominant AQAP propagandist like 
Awlaki, paired with growing civil unrest from the Arab Spring and the beginnings of a Houthi 
insurgency seem to have triggered the reorientation of AQAP’s propaganda to a locally-focused, 
Yemen strategy.  
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 AQAP lost much of its local power in late 2012, after the newly-elected President Abed 
Rabbu Hadi succeeded Saleh and launched a counterinsurgency against Ansar al-Sharia in 
Yemen’s southern governorates.167 Although it launched several attacks against Hadi’s new 
government initially, AQAP was ultimately driven from much of the urban areas under its 
control.168 Hadi’s campaign featured a force of 20,000 Yemeni soldiers bolstered with significant 
support from paid local tribal soldiers, as well as financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.169 The 
United States backed Hadi in his counterterrorism strategy as well, providing aerial support to 
Yemen’s limited air force and training of a new elite counterterrorism unit.170  
 AQAP’s financing has relied upon occupation of key economic centers, armed robbery, 
and payments for hostages. The group’s seizure of key southern port cities like Mukalla during 
the civil war have generated “millions of dollars for the group.”171 According to the U.S. 
Treasury, AQAP has made tens of millions of dollars from kidnapping, and former leader Nasir 
al-Wuhayshi praised it as the source of “half the spoils for a year-long operation in Yemen.”172 
AQAP also stages bank robberies, notably seizing several million dollars from Zinjibar Bank in 
2011.173 During its occupation of the port city Mukalla in 2015, an estimated $61 million was 
looted from port operations.174 The group reportedly earned $2 million per day while holding 
Mukalla in taxes on goods and fuel.175 The group also amasses funds through taxing and 
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smuggling oil, human and weapons trafficking, foreign donations from “like-minded 
supporters,” and external assistance from affiliates like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM).176  
 Since the establishment of the Islamic State wilayat in Yemen (ISY), AQAP has 
competed with ISY to attract recruits and build regional power.177 Like AQAP, the Islamic 
State’s expansion into Yemen in 2014 through then-Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s acceptance 
of an oath of allegiance from “Yemen’s mujahidin” rendered it poised to take advantage of 
Yemen’s security vacuum and Sunni hostility towards Houthi (and Shia) expansionism.178 
However, Yemen has not taken to ISY in the same way that it embraces AQAP. Indeed, ISY has 
never held territory in Yemen, a significant weakness considering the Islamic State’s doctrine 
calls for it to immediately establish a caliphate under Sharia law, and in comparison to AQAP’s 
repeated success.179 According to Yemen expert Elisabeth Kendall, ISY has estranged itself from 
Yemenis through its bombings of mosques; though linked to the Houthis, bombing public places 
of worship was seen as excessively cruel and indiscriminate in comparison to AQAP’s targeting 
of government and military personnel.180  
 While AQAP has succeeded in creating a “nascent caliphate” and integrating into local 
communities and tribes, ISY’s use of foreign fighters and relative lack of local recruits reflects 
the group’s struggle to gain a foothold in Yemen.181 Additionally, an ISY document denouncing 
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the appointed Saudi ISY leader signals an internal rift in the group, particularly between newly-
joined Yemenis and ISY leadership.182 While AQAP highlights its homegrown, locally-sourced 
status, ISY is considered an outside, “foreign” force.183 In general, ISY’s “foreignness” in dress, 
accents, and culture seem to have deterred Yemeni recruits and prompted them to side with the 
local favorite, AQAP, despite ISY’s flashy propaganda.184 Fighters have managed to defect from 
each of the jihadi groups to the other, though Kendall notes that the flow of defectors seems 
largely weighted in AQAP’s favor.185 Although ISY established two training camps in Al-Bayda 
province in 2016, the loss of these camps in US airstrikes demonstrates the group’s inability to 
hide, survive, and regroup like AQAP.186 AQAP’s upper hand in Yemen also stems from its 
success in uncovering ISY’s inflated claims and false propaganda. While ISY has portrayed an 
exaggerated view of its struggle against the Houthis and overall operations in Yemen, in reality, 
AQAP conducted as much as ten times as many operations in Yemen as ISY in 2016 and 
2017.187 
 Violence broke out between ISY and AQAP in Al-Bayda province in July 2018 
following ISY’s capture of thirteen AQAP fighters and local tribesmen, and increased hostilities 
between the groups exist on land and online currently.188 Both groups capitalize on the accounts 
of supposed defectors in propaganda. ISY, for example, released an video in which an AQAP 
defector criticized the group’s policy of working with the Yemeni army and naming AQAP as 
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the enemy of Yemenis (as opposed to the Houthis).189 AQAP has responded with its own 
propaganda highlighting ISY’s brutality and oppression of select tribes, in addition to continuing 
to launch small guerilla operations against the group.190 Espionage also appears as a concern of 
both groups, and the spy “confessions” which appear in propaganda signal a paranoia in both 
groups of infiltrators seeking to internally disrupt Yemen’s jihadi groups.191 Although both 
groups continue to provoke and bear arms against their rival, it is notable that ISY’s purpose in 
Yemen has changed drastically in an effort to counter AQAP. In 2018, 69% of ISY attacks in 
Yemen targeted AQAP members and holdings, while only 31% were targeted against the 
Houthis.192 Therefore, while ISY largely focuses on undermining AQAP, AQAP has retained the 
upper hand in its conflict against ISY and a larger interest in countering the Houthi insurgency, 
which allows it to continue to show itself as a protector of Yemen’s Sunni population.  
 Having learned from the response to its harsh governance under Sharia law in 2011-2012, 
AQAP currently provides public services and completes infrastructure projects in Yemen’s 
southern Hadramaut region, strengthening its ties with the local population and establishing its 
governing legitimacy.193 AQAP prioritizes providing basic welfare programs and material 
support to poor families to build rapport with Yemen’s tribes.194 In After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, 
the Next Generation, Abdel Bari Atwan describes AQAP’s new method to integrate into tribes; 
instead of provoking the tribes, AQAP sends a few fighters into tribal areas to distribute leaflets 
                                                
189 Ibid. This video was deemed “unconvincing” by Kendall due to the likelihood of the defector being coerced. It’s 
possible that the groups also employ an actor to pose as a defector.  
190 Ibid.  
191 Kendall, “The Failing Islamic State Within the Failed State of Yemen,” 82.  
192 Kendall, “The Failing Islamic State Within the Failed State of Yemen,” 81.  
193 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Counter Extremism Project, 6.  




and digital media, and they develop a group of sympathizers within the tribe who will vouch for 
larger numbers of jihadists to be invited into the community.195 
 As a result of the loyalist Houthi insurgency launched in the north and President Hadi’s 
forced exile, the threat of an AQAP insurgency was once again neglected by a government under 
pressure. Since Hadi was forced to flee into exile in Riyadh in February 2015, AQAP has 
remained unchallenged by the Yemeni military.196 The group has retaken pockets of territory in 
central and southern Yemen, notably in Yemen’s Abyan, Al-Bayda, Hadramaut, Shabwah, and 
Zamakh governorates (see Figure 1).197  
 
Figure 1: Map of Al Qaeda Presence in Yemen as of September 2019, Congressional Research 
Service198 
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A large training camp near the AQAP stronghold Zinjibar reportedly hosts hundreds of recruits 
with their families in a “self-sufficient community.”199 The lack of a functioning government in 
Yemen and the resulting chaos has created the perfect conditions in the country to enable AQAP 
to regroup, train, operate, and spread its influence. 
Ideology and Propaganda   
 Although Western scholars have always considered AQAP as an Al Qaeda affiliate, these 
ties seem to have dissipated by the time of Osama bin Laden’s assassination in 2011.200 In his 
lifetime, bin Laden was wary of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born AQAP propagandist, and 
dreaded the possibility of him becoming emir of AQAP, despite Awlaki’s clear targeting of the 
West.201 Bin Laden also wrote of being “upset and disappointed” with AQAP’s focus on 
countering the Saleh regime, neglecting Al Qaeda’s primary goal of attacking the United 
States.202 He would later condemn AQAP’s brutal caliphate, asserting that its gruesome 
implementation of Sharia law would alienate its citizens and fail to gain local support.203 
According to documents recovered during the Abbottabad raid, bin Laden was critical of AQAP 
as “inexperienced, prone to mistakes, and too-focused on Yemen.”204  
 AQAP has adopted radically different priorities, functioning almost independently from 
the influence of “Al Qaeda Central” and bin Laden’s international aims.205 Whereas al Qaeda’s 
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primary goal is to end the United States’ “imperial” involvement in the Middle East, AQAP 
prioritizes the establishment of a caliphate in Yemen and embedding itself among the local 
population.206 In the group’s inaugural video in 2009, Nasir al-Wuhayshi declared AQAP’s goals 
to establish a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East and implement 
Sharia law.207 At the end of his speech, Wuhayshi prays “give us the honor by establishing the 
Islamic State with our hands.”208 A document from 2012 outlines AQAP’s primary goals as to 
“expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula and establish the Islamic Caliphate 
and Shari’ah rule which the apostate governments have suspended.”209 While Al Qaeda’s 
ideology, unlike the Islamic State, historically recognized the creation of a caliphate under Sharia 
law as a long-term, aspirational, and far off goal, AQAP has sought to seize and govern territory 
in the country’s southern governorates under Sharia law since 2009.210 Al Qaeda senior 
leadership has consistently warned against the premature establishment of a caliphate, ridiculing 
AQAP for its defeat in 2012 and openly criticizing the Islamic State as lacking the religious 
credentials to govern.211  
 AQAP’s infamy was also a product of its success in targeting Western audiences with its 
online propaganda, radicalizing sympathizers, and inspiring lone wolf attacks.212 Under the 
influence of Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP primarily targeted Western young men sympathetic to the 
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jihadist cause who could be influenced by AQAP via social media for recruitment.213 AQAP’s 
online propaganda sought to inspire homegrown attacks against the West. The FBI reportedly 
named Awlaki as the “spiritual leader of the hijackers on the flight that crashed into the 
Pentagon” due to his ties to two 9/11 hijackers, one of whom had worshipped at Awlaki’s 
Virginia mosque.214 The terrorist who attacked the army base in Fort Hood, Texas, in November 
2009 had been personally corresponding with Awlaki.215 Awlaki also inspired a failed attempt in 
May 2010 to car bomb Times Square.216 Reeling in the wake of September 11, 2001 and 
narrowly avoiding several other “terrorist spectaculars,” the United States feared an attack 
emanating out of Yemen. 
 The online propaganda disseminated by AQAP has been recognized as designed to 
appeal to Western audiences. Under the leadership of Awlaki and editor Samir Khan (another 
American), AQAP began to publish Inspire, a slick online magazine written in English and also 
targeted at Westerners, in January 2010.217 With instructional articles like “How to Make a 
Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,” Inspire could easily reach recruits in the West “without the 
need to travel to Yemen or speak Arabic.”218 Beginning in jihadist chatrooms and websites, 
Awlaki built a following by recording his sermons, producing a 53-CD boxed set before turning 
to YouTube.219 In 2017, a search for “Anwar al-Awlaki” on YouTube still yielded over 70,000 
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results, a testament to the cleric’s posthumous influence.220 AQAP adapted with social media to 
gain a significant presence on popular apps like Twitter and Telegram.221 Like many jihadist 
groups, AQAP’s Twitter presence was coded so that if an account was suspended, another 
immediately generated in its place.222 Although internet companies like Twitter and YouTube 
(owned by Google) have been painstakingly slow to crackdown on the jihadist propaganda 
flooding their sites, both companies have achieved a degree of success in removing jihadist 
materials.223 
 Little is known about AQAP’s propaganda branch outside of its Western-targeted 
products. The group’s official propaganda branch is called “Sada al-Malahem Media,” (The 
Echo of Battles) which publishes an Arabic-language magazine directed at a Yemeni audience 
two times a month alongside its Western counterpart, Inspire.224 Sada al-Malahem is notable for 
the precise timing of its highlighting of local grievances, as it seeks to target the Yemeni 
government by providing political and theological justifications preemptively or directly after 
attacks.225 The group also reportedly showcases its public service projects in al-Masra, a digital 
newsletter that features network-wide Al Qaeda updates and a focus on the group’s stance on 
high-profile events and politics.226 In 2018, AQAP launched al-Badr Media on the Telegram app 
in an attempt to kick start its media presence after key leaders such as Abu Hajar al-Makki (Al-
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Malahem’s main propagandist) were eliminated by American counterterrorism operations.227 Al-
Badr seeks to draw in Yemeni recruits by offering tips such as how to avoid American drones 
and surveillance, playing on local anti-American sentiment and security concerns.228 
By 2011, AQAP’s high-profile, international plots warranted its identification as “the 
most significant terrorist threat to the United States homeland,” according to the Director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter.229 The group first struck Saudi Arabia in 
August 2009, when a suicide bomber narrowly failed in assassinating Prince Mohammed bin 
Nayef.230 The device was made by Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, the infamous Saudi bomb maker 
who joined AQAP in 2009 and was considered “the most dangerous man in the world by 
Western intelligence.”231 In December 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, having received 
training and explosives from AQAP, failed in his attempt to detonate a bomb embedded in his 
underwear on a trans-Atlantic flight bound for Detroit.232 Saudi intelligence helped to intercept 
AQAP’s package bombs mailed from Yemen via UPS and FedEx through Dubai and London to 
two synagogues in Chicago in November 2010.233 In May 2012, the CIA thwarted another 
AQAP suicide bomber armed with an experimental explosive device before he attempted to 
board an airliner to travel to the United States.234 
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 The aggressive counterterrorism strategy centered on the use of drone strikes adopted by 
President Obama in 2012 and expanded under the Trump Administration has, according to 
various government assessments, achieved a degree of success in countering AQAP.235 This is 
consistent with the smaller volume of AQAP video propaganda published between 2017 and the 
present, noted as a result of this survey, as terrorist groups’ propaganda volume tends to 
deteriorate in quantity and quality when a group is under attack. According to the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, the United States has conducted over 200 confirmed drone strikes in 
Yemen under the Trump Administration.236 Further, President Trump’s June 2019 letter to 
Congress confirmed that a small unit of United States Special Operations Forces in Yemen seeks 
to work with regional partners to counter AQAP and jihadists in the Islamic State’s Yemen 
wilayat.237 Dr. Michael Boyle writes that drone strikes can be reframed as signals of a 
government’s “helpless[ness] and subservience to the United States,” deepening anti-American 
sentiment and playing into the jihadist narrative of the United States as a crusading invader.238 
Therefore, American drone strikes, which may be extremely useful when accurately targeting 
terrorist leaders in decapitation strikes, may ultimately be dangerously repurposed to drive 
citizens into the ranks of groups like AQAP.239 
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 Although reeling under American counterterrorism strikes, AQAP continues to survive in 
Yemen, having conducted nine attacks killing over 55 people in 2019 alone.240 The efficacy of 
drone strikes is limited simply because of the inability to discern an AQAP militant from a 
Yemeni civilian, as most Yemeni civilians are armed and some tribes have access to military-
grade weaponry.241 The United States’ continued use of drones despite this handicap has 
received negative attention, as the Bureau of Investigative Journalism claims drone strikes in 
Yemen have killed a minimum of 174 civilians, including at least 44 children.242 This has 
allowed AQAP to use the drone campaign to its advantage, casting American drone strikes as 
evidence of American aggression and a “crusader-like” fixation on the Middle East.243 Terrorism 
expert Michael Boyle argues that drone usage in Yemen helps create new recruits for groups like 
AQAP by corroding government stability and deepening anti-American sentiment.244 In fact, 
Boyle directly links the strengthened ties between local tribes and AQAP to a desire for revenge 
following civilian deaths from American drone strikes.245 He believes the strikes, framed by 
AQAP rhetoric, have “bred a psychological acceptance” of AQAP among Yemenis.246 Though 
AQAP’s leadership structure is under fire, its operational and propaganda capabilities have fed 
on the destruction caused by American drones and fueled its success in gaining local influence in 
Yemen.  
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Chapter 3: Video Data 
Yemen has become the rear base for all jihadi work in the world. 
-Osama bin Laden, April 2011247 
Methodology 
 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its insurgent arm Ansar al-Sharia posted upwards 
of 527 individual pieces of media (videos, audio nashids, and online statements in PDF format) 
on the Telegram app between the start of the civil war on 22 March 2015 and February 2020. 
This media dataset was collected via Jihadology.net, an online clearinghouse for jihadi primary 
source material developed by Aaron Y. Zelin. Zelin monitors the encrypted app Telegram, 
collecting propaganda from numerous jihadist groups including AQAP and posting it to his 
website for academic research purposes.248 The product of Zelin’s personal interest has grown 
into an enormous and thorough library of terrorist propaganda accessible for students and 
researchers. He uses a system of cataloguing in which each post is sorted through the tags Zelin 
adds to the post. For example, an AQAP video is often tagged with “AQAP,” “Yemen,” the 
name of the media production center which produced the video, (usually al-Malahim Media), 
and sometimes the name of a featured speaker.  
Using the “AQAP” tag, which sorts all posts tagged under “AQAP” in order from the 
most recent, 527 pieces of media published by AQAP between February 2020 and March 2015 
were catalogued to gauge the group’s volume of media production. Only video messages posted 
during the civil war timeframe were selected for further research. Audio nashids and online 
statements make up just over 51% of AQAP’s total media output. However, audio nashids were 
considered outside the parameters of this survey as, though they are often paired with an 
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accompanying still-image graphic that serves as the front image while the audio plays, there is no 
visual sequence to the media posts. In addition, online statements were not surveyed further, 
again, because visuals are clearly not driving their appeal. This choice stemmed from a growing 
interest in focusing on the visual imagery and narratives AQAP was able to produce during this 
chaotic, yet transformative period of resurgence for the group. Online magazines, such as issues 
of AQAP’s Arabic propaganda magazine, al-Masra, were not included in the dataset either due 
to the empirical evidence that suggests moving images have a greater impact on emotion and 
memory than still images.249 Eliminating the group’s audio nashids, documents, and magazines, 
AQAP published a minimum of 256 video messages on the Telegram app between 22 March 
2015 and February 2020.  
 In order to provide an accurate sampling of this large dataset, a smaller cache of 32 
AQAP videos was selected as a simple random sample to represent the larger dataset of 256 
videos. The smaller cache of videos was calculated to best represent the media output of six 
consecutive years (2015-2020) in proportion to the number of videos disseminated during each 
year. For example, the original dataset suggests that AQAP disseminated 61 videos in 2015, 
roughly 24% of the 256 total videos. Therefore, the author has selected eight videos at random 
from the 61 total videos disseminated in 2015 to represent AQAP’s media output during that 
year (as close a match as possible to achieve 24% of the 32 videos selected in proportion to the 
larger set). The breakdown of the 32 total video messages by year is as follows: eight videos 
from 2015, seven videos from 2016, nine videos from 2017, five videos from 2018, two videos 
from 2019, and one video from 2020.  
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Originality of Research and Limitations   
 The literature on AQAP propaganda is limited, and often focuses entirely upon AQAP’s 
Western-facing media product Inspire. One of the only discussions of AQAP propaganda as 
consumed by Yemeni civilians asserts that AQAP advertises itself as performing public works 
projects in order to win the hearts and minds of locals.250 The Counter Extremism Project’s 
primer on AQAP discusses its public services, such as the construction of bridges, digging of 
wells, and distribution of humanitarian aid as “highlighted on its social media accounts and in its 
Arabic-language propaganda magazine, al-Masra.”251 Michael Horton discusses this “more 
covert strategy” as a tool by which AQAP may identify itself as an ally of Yemen’s Sunni 
population and an enemy of northern Shia Houthis.252 Neither source references videos in its 
discussion of this new outreach strategy. Instead, the Counter Extremism Project’s report is 
based on news articles discussing the social services offered by AQAP to gain the trust of local 
tribes and establish shared governance.253 Horton’s discussion of AQAP’s philanthropic strategy 
stems from his interviews with Yemeni officials and journalists, as well as a 2012 Guardian 
article detailing AQAP’s offering water and electricity alongside its brutal implementation of 
Sharia law.254 
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 To the author’s knowledge, no study has attempted to survey AQAP’s video propaganda, 
particularly during the civil war time period: 22 March 2015 – present. This is despite the fact 
that a large number of studies have investigated the still images and instructional articles 
encouraging jihad in AQAP’s Inspire.255 Indeed, the online magazine’s link to the radicalization 
of attackers in the United States and Great Britain warrants this robust research effort, as cases 
include the perpetrators of the 2005 London suicide attacks, the Boston Marathon bombers of 
April 2013, and the couple responsible for the 2015 San Bernardino shootings to name only a 
few.256 The role that still images and magazine articles have played proves they are undeniably 
persuasive, or at least can be under some circumstances. However, empirical evidence indicates 
that moving images, even relative to a still image generated from a screen-grab of a moving 
image, prompt a great physiological and emotional response in a viewer.257 Video’s ability to 
hold a viewer’s attention and impact a viewer’s memory makes a further case for prioritizing the 
investigation of video propaganda.258  
                                                
255 For discussion of AQAP’s Inspire, see Anthony F. Lemieux, Jarret M. Brachman, Jason Levitt, and Jay Wood, 
“Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the 
Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (2014): 354-371. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.828604. See also Xander Kirke, “Violence and Political Myth: Radicalizing 
Believers in the Pages of Inspire Magazine,” International Political Sociology 9, no. 4 (December 2015): 283-298, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12098. See also D. B. Skillicorn and E. F. Reid, “Language Use in Inspire Magazine,” 
2013 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, Seattle, WA, (2013): 239-244. 
10.1109/ISI.2013.6578827. See also Meagan Schreiner, Mark A. E. Williams, S. David Zuckerman, “Inspirations 
and Limitations: Reason, the Universal Audience, and Inspire Magazine,” Journal of Communication & Religion 36, 
no. 1 (April 2013): 196-21,  http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/98612759/inspirations-limitations-reason-
universal-audience-inspire-magazine. See also Julian Droogan and Shane Peattie, “Reading Jihad: Mapping the 
shifting themes of Inspire magazine,” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 4 (2018): 685-686, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1211527. 
256 See “Digital Developments: Extremists’ Use of Modern Communications Tools,” Counter Extremism Project, 
March 2019, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Digital%20Developments_031819.pdf, 7-8. See 
also Droogan and Peattie, “Reading Jihad,” 685.  
257 Benjamin H. Detenber and Robert F. Simons, “Roll ‘Em: The Effects of Picture Motion on Emotional 
Responses,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media,” 42, no. 1 (1998): 113, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08838159809364437.  
258 Ibid. See also Ayse Candan, James E. Cutting, and Jordan E. DeLong, “RSVP at the Movies: Dynamic Images 
Are Remembered Better Than Static Images When Resources Are Limited,” Visual Cognition 23, no. 9-10, 2015: 




 The lack of emphasis on video propaganda from such a prolific Al Qaeda affiliate as 
AQAP is curious. AQAP’s inaugural video in 2009 warranted significant attention as  a marker 
of the consolidation of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen into a dual-state Al Qaeda 
affiliate.259 A Reuters Special Report, “How Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen has Made Al Qaeda 
Stronger – and Richer,” from April 2016 cites videos produced in the then-AQAP controlled 
Hadramaut region.260 The report references specific videos in which AQAP is shown guarding 
the port of Mukalla, laying pipes, promising to repay taxes paid to the government, and 
delivering medical supplies to a local hospital.261 This is one of the only sources that appears to 
reference specific AQAP videos released during the civil war in Yemen.262 AQAP’s July 2016 
video “Military Training Camp of the Commander Hamzah al-Zinjubari,” which appears in this 
dataset, received attention from the Long War Journal due to its advertisement of a “special 
forces” training camp and movie-like action sequences.263 Otherwise, discussion of specific Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula video messages in either news articles or academic works is 
severely limited. This is a critical gap in the research on terrorist propaganda that this study 
begins to attempt to fill.  
Limitations 
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 This study is entirely reliant upon the content posted by Zelin on Jihadology.net. His 
coverage of groups including AQAP, the Islamic State and its wilayats, Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is extensive, yet it is unreasonable to assume he can locate 
and document all media products of all groups through his presence on Telegram. Zelin likely 
has personal selection criteria by which he chooses media products from the Telegram app for 
his website. He inevitably cannot find everything the group posts as he likely cannot cover all 
their channels. Therefore, the initial cache of 256 videos likely does not include all AQAP videos 
posted between March 2015 and the present. Further, the dates for each video message represent 
the date Zelin posted the video onto Jihadology.net, rather than the date the group released the 
video. One must observe two “lag periods” in the timeline: the period between the initial post of 
the video by a jihadist-aligned source and Zelin’s discovery of the video, as well as the period 
between Zelin’s initial discovery and the posting of this video on his website.  
 On initial inspection, Zelin’s reposting capability appears hardly delayed, as several of 
the Ansar al-Sharia videos record the date of publishing only a few days prior to Zelin’s 
posting.264 For example, Ansar al-Sharia’s “Aspects of Fixing the Electricity Times” depicts a 
January 24, 2016 release date, only two days prior to Zelin’s post – a testament to the reliability 
of his reposting speed. Finally, it must be noted that the small cache of 32 videos, while a 
necessity for the feasibility of this project, cannot represent the large cache (254 videos) in its 
entirely. However, due to the random nature of the sample and its proportionality to media 
output, this sample should provide an adequate reflection of the whole.  
 It is worth noting that the author does not speak, read, or write Arabic. Prior study of 
jihadist groups and their radical Islamic propaganda led to a familiarity, however, with a small 
                                                
264 It should be noted that the majority of AQAP’s videos do not include a specific release date, and it is difficult to 




select, specialized vocabulary of Arabic words. For example, words like “kuffar,” “bay’ah,” and 
“hijrah” as used by jihadists to refer to non-believers, a pledge of allegiance, and a foreign 
fighter’s journey from his home country to a territory held by a terrorist group, are used 
consistently by all these groups.  
 However, given that the focus of this study is the visual imagery portrayed in these 
videos and the conclusions to be drawn from the visual narrative, rather than the words and audio 
that accompanies the video, the limitation should be a minimal one.265 The author is trained and 
experienced in reading the visual, both through her undergraduate curriculum and her work on a 
research team that analyzes the visual imagery of jihadist and right-wing extremist video 
propaganda. Videos that record a sheik’s sermon have been evaluated not for the persuasiveness 
of the discursive rhetoric of the sermon, but instead for how the speaker, background, and 
graphics have been manipulated to appeal to a specific audience. In fact, each of the videos 
surveyed could have been watched without the volume engaged, though the audio effects and 
quality are notable and relevant in certain cases.  
 Second, a researcher with Western eyes investigating a media product that has been 
designed for a different audience, a native of Yemen, will inevitably be limited by some degree 
of innate bias. AQAP undoubtedly creates media targeted toward both Western and Arabic-
speaking audiences. But this is not an insurmountable limitation either; knowing that it is 
necessary to always consider how the intended audiences of these products would have viewed 
them (despite that being an impossible task), it is possible to keep the critic’s interpretive work 
on the right track. The following data analysis will attempt to determine which videos (if any) 
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were composed with consideration of a Western viewer as opposed to a viewer in Yemen, and 
surely a Western analyst can make that assessment.  
 The author has attempted to learn and comprehend the intricacies of Yemeni politics, 
tribes, and culture in order to recognize which appeals are intended to target a local, Yemeni 
audience. There is no doubt that this tailoring of media products has occurred. AQAP capitalizes 
on its significant local ties to Yemen’s tribes, and this homegrown aspect of the group is thought 
to be one of the reasons why it holds the upper hand in its competition with Islamic State - 
Yemen.266 The author has approached this survey attempting to place herself in the shoes of a 
citizen on the ground in Yemen, asking the question: why or why not would this video appeal to 
a viewer as a Yemeni? Due to the data’s parameters as videos only disseminated during the civil 
war, war politics and humanitarian concerns have been taken into account when making this 
determination. However, the author cannot claim to recognize or understand all of the visual 
narratives that might persuade a Yemeni as opposed to a Westerner. In fact, in some cases the 
author has relied upon investigation of that which is least comprehensible to her at first glance in 
order to discern what appeals are designated for a Yemeni audience vs. a Western audience. Still, 
the author remains limited to a specific portion of AQAP propaganda, yet choosing to focus on 
the other, locally-focused portion without being the intended primary audience for that portion.  
AQAP Video Messages March 2015-Present  
 Prior to the selection of the small cache of 32 videos to represent the video dataset, a 
broader survey of AQAP video messages was taken in an effort to establish thematic categories 
into which videos could be sorted. The author completed a random survey of roughly one third 
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of the 256 video dataset, watching the videos to gain a sense of common themes present in 
AQAP video messages.  
 Investigation of AQAP propaganda from the start of the civil war indicates that AQAP 
represents itself as having played an important role in the conflict; it films insurgent attacks 
against both the Houthi rebels and Yemen’s government forces, claiming an allegiance to neither 
side. Further, AQAP depicts training sequences, bombings, and fraternity amongst its fighters 
from a first-person, video game-like perspective that seeks to appeal to a young audience. AQAP 
also advertises itself as having ample access to food, resources, and medical supplies, an appeal 
to a starving and vulnerable population seeking shelter in Yemen. A survey of this video 
propaganda reveals five distinct categories embedded in AQAP propaganda throughout the 
course of the civil war: the insurgency of Ansar al-Sharia, local public services, recorded 
sermons, competition with the Islamic State wilayat in Yemen (ISY), and “espionage.” The 
breakdown of the 32-video cache by category is as follows: eight insurgency of Ansar al-Sharia 
videos, six local public services videos, fourteen recorded sermon videos, three competition with 
ISY videos, and one espionage video. 
The Insurgency of Ansar al-Sharia  
 Videos of operations launched by AQAP’s insurgent arm Ansar al-Sharia in southern 
Yemen make up exactly 25% of the dataset surveyed, the second largest category of videos after 
recorded sermons.267 Through filming the activities of the insurgency of Ansar al-Sharia, AQAP 
seeks to establish itself as a worthy opponent to the Yemeni government forces. It will require 
some effort to persuade their audience of this, given that the government is backed by the Saudi-
led coalition and American aid, yet it is likely that the bar is not that high. Given that the 
                                                




government and Saudi forces are shown targeting and indiscriminately murdering Yemeni 
children, they do not need to show themselves as equaling opponents, but only as equaling them 
in determination and effort. These videos seek to capitalize on anti-American sentiment, 
showcasing the destruction and deaths resulting from American-supported coalition air strikes. 
As many of these videos are shot in Shabwa, Al-Bayda, and Abyan governorates in which Ansar 
al-Sharia holds territory, the group seeks to show that it is committed to protecting its territory 
and the locals who live within it against government forces.  
 This category strongly supports the view that AQAP’s target audience has shifted to 
include local Yemeni civilians. In an effort to obscure the link between the insurgency and 
AQAP, all eight videos in the dataset have been branded with Ansar al-Sharia’s circular 
medallion logo and do not contain any evident link to Al Qaeda. This is an intentional rebranding 
effort on the part of AQAP designed to blur the connection between itself and Ansar al-Sharia. 
By launching Ansar al-Sharia as a group separate from AQAP and known for its social services 
and protection of Sunnis from the Houthi insurgency, AQAP can build rapport with locals 
without the initial stigma of being connected to a hunted terrorist organization. AQAP’s interest 
in concealing its ties to Ansar al-Sharia suggests it seeks to recruit locals who may have been 
alienated by AQAP’s brutal track record of forcibly implementing Sharia law in its captured 
territories in 2012. Additionally, seven of the eight videos are conducted in Arabic only, 
suggesting it is targeting an Arabic-speaking audience. The lingual outlier in this category of 
videos is Ansar al-Sharia’s “Military Training Camp of Commander Hamzah al-Zinjubari” 
video, which features Arabic subtitled in English.268 This video is one of only two in the entire 
32-video dataset that features English translation. This prioritization of addressing an Arabic-
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speaking audience without accessibility for monolingual English speakers is notable given 
AQAP’s perceived focus on Western audiences.  
 The significant breadth of locations featured in this category are representative of 
AQAP’s strategy of appealing to a wide Yemeni audience. Although three of the eight videos are 
shot in unknown locations, the rest represent five different Al Qaeda strongholds in Yemen: 
Taiz, Al-Hudaydah, Abyan, Al-Bayda, and Shabwa. By advertising its operations against 
Houthis, government forces, and coalition-backed militias in Yemen’s central and southern 
governorates, AQAP targets a Yemeni population this is Sunni, historically interested in 
succession from Yemen’s central government, and has endured war crimes committed by the 
coalition.  
 Ansar al-Sharia also seeks to establish itself as a foe of the Houthi insurgency that has 
menaced the Yemeni Sunni population in its violent show of force against Yemen’s military and 
civilians. Through “Explosive Devices Upon the Houthi Army” and “Appeals of the Houthi 
Prisoners #2,” AQAP seeks to connect with a 65% majority Sunni population in Yemen which 
fears Shia (and Iranian) expansionism.269 AQAP situates itself as the enemy of Houthis, for 
example filming fighters packing ball bearings into explosive devices that are later detonated in 
attacks against Houthi supporters and vehicles.270  
 The video pauses before an attack each time, superimposing a dark, shadow-like filter 
onto the picture plane while drawing the eye to a specific individual or vehicle highlighted in 
light right before the sequence continues and the Houthi target is eliminated.271 The overall 
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production quality of this video is low, including disorienting fumbling or drops of the camera 
after a bomb’s detonation. 272 However, the message is clear: AQAP seeks to actively attack 
Houthis in precision strikes while noticeably minimizing collateral damage. This purpose is even 
more persuasive given the Houthi insurgency’s terrorizing of the Yemeni population in 
indiscriminately shelling cities and burying hundreds of landmines in residential areas.273 In 
“Appeals of the Houthi prisoners #2,” AQAP seeks to capitalize on the paranoia Yemen’s Sunni 
population likely feels in relation to a Houthi insurgency backed by the country’s 35% Shia 
population. The video features interviews with an elderly man, a young adult likely in his early 
twenties, and a teenager.274 This choice of interview subjects is intentional; it suggests that the 
Houthi insurgency is a broad movement spanning three generations, warning Yemen’s Sunnis 
that the conflict is far from over.  
 In almost every Ansar al-Sharia video surveyed in this study, AQAP attempts to portray 
the United States and Yemeni governments as indiscriminate killers in order to undermine the 
government’s legitimacy while spreading anti-American sentiment among Yemeni civilians. For 
example, in “Dust of the Battles,” news clips featuring Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, and 
Trump and a U.S. Air Force plane taking off on a runway are followed by footage of a dust cloud 
rising in a city in Yemen.275 Immediately after this, a father cradles his son, and the shot switches 
into frame after frame of bloodied Yemeni children, presumably either dead or injured by the 
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American airstrike.276 The emphasis on war crimes, like the constant imagery of the targeting of 
civilians and the deaths of Yemeni children, plays on Al Qaeda’s narrative that the United States 
is waging a war on Islam, a theme common not only in AQAP videos, but the majority of Al 
Qaeda output.277 These extremely powerful scenes attempt to paint the United States, the Saudi-
led coalition, and the Yemeni government as complicit in war crimes and thus to inspire the 
Yemeni populace to retaliate.  
  In four of the eight insurgency videos, AQAP uses operational sequences, interviews 
with locals, and footage of the devastation of the civil war to identify itself as an enemy of the 
Yemeni government and coalition. For example, in “Inghimasiyya Operation Upon the Political 
Security Building – Wilayat al-Hudaydah,” the opening sequences show the aftermath of a 
coalition airstrike, buildings reduced to rubble, civilians with gruesome injuries, even bodies 
visibly pinned beneath concrete slabs.278 The bloody scene is followed by interviews of local 
Yemenis, including a Yemeni woman—one of only two women present in the dataset—whose 
emotional response to the devastation, wailing in agony with eyes full of tears, is memorable.279 
It is important to note that it is apparent local citizens are being interviewed because their faces 
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Charlie Winter and Joe Whittaker, “The Islamic State’s Suicide Industry,” Action on Armed Violence, October 4, 
2017, https://aoav.org.uk/2017/islamic-states-suicide-industry/.  




are never blurred out, while the faces of Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP fighters are always blurred 
out in the video’s editing, one presumes for reasons of operational security.  
 AQAP paints itself as the avengers of the bloodshed in al-Hudayah governorate, 
assaulting a political security building at night and controlling the compound by morning.280 In a 
similar sequence, “Liberation of Waqar City From the Gangs of Abd al-latif al-Sayyid – Wilayat 
Abyan” begins its narrative with interviews of visibly distraught residents of Abyan 
governorate.281 One woman interviewed began to cry as she spoke directly to the camera, a 
gloved hand reaching up to wipe her tears.282 These interviews likely portray the local experience 
under the leadership of al-Sayyid, a former Al Qaeda leader who defected from the group to lead 
popular resistance committees armed by the government to discipline southern regions like 
Abyan.283 The video then shows AQAP’s assault on Waqar city, driving al-Sayyid’s fighters 
from the residential areas and seizing the committees’ military-grade weaponry, including 
tanks.284 By situating itself as an enemy of the coalition, government, and government-backed 
militias, AQAP seeks to position itself as the advocate of locals in Yemen’s south. This message 
would particularly resonate with a southern and central Yemeni audience which has historically 
staged secessionist movements and has been indiscriminately targeted by coalition forces. 
  These eight videos are by far the most visually rich and modern productions in the 
dataset. While recorded sermons call to mind Al Qaeda in the age of Osama bin Laden, these 
                                                
280 ‘Inghimasiyya Operation Upon the Political Security Building – Wilayat al-Hudaydah,’” (3:29-6:19).  
281 “New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: Liberation of Waqar City From the 
Gangs of Abd al-latif al-Sayyid – Wilayat Abyan,” (24:35).  
282 “New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: Liberation of Waqar City From the 
Gangs of Abd al-latif al-Sayyid – Wilayat Abyan,” (3:31-4:09).  
283 Nasser Arrabyee, “Rising Extremsim in Yemen,” Carnegie Middle East Center, February 19, 2016, 
https://carnegie-mec.org/sada/62832. See also Casey L. Coombs, “Yemen’s Use of Militias to Maintain.” 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point 6, no. 2 (February 2013), https://ctc.usma.edu/yemens-use-of-militias-
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videos feature elaborate action sequences shot from a first-person, video game-like perspective, 
birds-eye view footage shot from drones, and overlay of graphics, for example a rifle’s sights. 
These elements clearly represent the “video game motif” emerging in jihadist propaganda as 
defined in Dauber et al.’s “Call of Duty: Jihad – How the Video Game Motif has Migrated 
Downstream from Islamic State Propaganda Videos.”285 Six of the eight total insurgency videos 
feature the use of first-person shooter perspective likely captured by Go-Pro footage.286 These 
sequences allow the viewer to imagine himself as holding and firing an AK-47 in the picture 
frame and running through Yemen’s streets as a part of the insurgency. In Ansar al-Sharia’s 
video “The Battle of al-Jih-malīyyah – Wilāyat Ta’iz,” for example, a video game-like sequence 
occurs in which the viewer follows a “fellow” insurgent into the city streets as they begin their 
assault on Taiz governorate, dodging gunfire.287 A red wash appears over the screen to indicate 
you (the viewer) have been shot, and a graphic of a red target flits across the screen showing 
your attacker’s movements (Figure 2). You take cover from enemy fire, where your friend 
pauses to bandage your bleeding hand (Figure 3). The sequence continues as you run through the 
streets, a slow motion effect added to dramatize the movement as you leave safety and run across 
a street while vulnerable to enemy fire.288 The viewer is part of the victory – cornering a target 
and triumphing over AQAP’s Houthi adversaries. The game-like perspective of this video is very 
much like the experience described by Dr. Jarret Brachman, the previous director of research at 
the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, in his 2011 testimony before the Subcommittee 
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https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2019/issue-3/02--
dauber-et-al..pdf.  
286 Dauber et al., “Call of Duty: Jihad – How the Video Game Motif has Migrated Downstream from Islamic State 
Propaganda Videos,” 18.  
287 “New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘The Battle of al-Jih-malīyyah – Wilāyat 
Ta’iz,’” (16:27).  




on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Brachman wrote “they have turned Al Qaeda into an 
online game, an escapist fantasy empowering their audience with new knowledge, skills sets, and 
role models. Ordinary guys are turned superheroes.”289 
 
Figure 2: Screen Grab from Ansar al-Sharia’s “The Battle of al-Jih-malīyyah – Wilāyat Ta’iz” (12:31).290  
 
 
Figure 3: Screen Grab from Ansar al-Sharia’s “The Battle of al-Jih-malīyyah – Wilāyat Ta’iz” (12:50).291  
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 The outlier in this set is “Military Training Camp of the Commander Hamzah al-
Zinjubari,” a visual narrative of the training undergone by AQAP’s “Special Forces” unit.292 This 
video initially appears to be a recruitment video, using clear buzz words like “determination,” 
“honor” and “patience,” just as American sports teams often use to advertise their discipline and 
teamwork.293 The video’s many training sequences, from firing a rifle to hand-to-hand combat 
drills and drills in kidnapping operations, demonstrate AQAP’s resolve to “educate any Muslim 
in the weaponry and the skills of war.”294 However, the English subtitles which appear in this 
video, and the address to America given by an AQAP drill sergeant in the video, signify a second 
audience: the United States. The masked fighter speaks directly to the camera, saying:  
America…we at the special task battalion at the Commander Hamza Zinjibary 
Training Camp have indeed prepared for you that will inflict you pain…As for 
you (sic) killing of commander Hamza, the blood of a martyr is light and fire. 
You have killed Hamza. Have you been able to eliminate jihad? Or to destroy its  
principles? As Abyan, Shabwa, Baydha and Hadhramout (sic) who Hamza was. 
And ask Yemen to tell you about Hamza. They will answer you of his bravery, 
manhood, cleverness, and valor.295 
 
The fighter’s words are a testament to the deep ties between Yemen’s south and AQAP.  
 Fitting with the themes of this category, this training video seeks to recruit a young, 
Yemeni audience in much the same way a karate studio might recruit – by showing disciplined 
students performing impressive drills. However, the video is an outlier in that it clearly addresses 
(and seeks to intimidate) the United States in response to the killing of al-Zinjubari, also known 
as Jalal Baleedi, in an American drone strike in February 2016.296 
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  Although these videos show the gruesome deaths and destruction resulting from 
American and coalition airstrikes, they also collectively demonstrate AQAP’s resilience. Footage 
of Ansar al-Sharia’s training and operations in “Military Training Camp of the Commander 
Hamzah al-Zinjubari” reminds the viewer that the group is not defeated, remains capable, and 
actively waging jihad in Yemen’s south.297 The haunting message that is the last frame of every 
Ansar al-Sharia video proclaims “we are coming,” implying that the group will continue to fight 
back and spread its influence.  
Local Public Services  
 The video messages in which AQAP seeks to advertise itself as a benevolent ruler 
through the public services it provides make up almost 20% of this dataset (6 videos).298 In these 
videos, AQAP flaunts the exceptional access it provides to resources, films the transformative 
outcomes of its public works projects, and demonstrates its commitment to ensuring the 
livelihood of citizens within its governorates—a stark contrast to its brutal implementation of 
Sharia Law in 2011-2012. AQAP clearly demonstrates its aspiration to win the hearts and minds 
of the Yemeni people by establishing itself as the only group that is able to meet their basic 
needs. Again, these six videos conceal the connection to AQAP in order to manipulate local 
recruits into believing they are not aligning themselves with Al Qaeda.299 Additionally, these 
videos are solely conducted in Arabic, further indicating their tailoring to appeal to a local 
Yemeni audience. Due to the production of all six videos in AQAP’s “wilayat Hadramaut,” the 
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audience for this category can be further narrowed to locals within and around Yemen’s 
Hadramaut governorate.  
 These six videos all follow the same basic narrative sequence. AQAP depicts a problem 
in the initial minutes of the videos: typically damaged infrastructure or humanitarian needs. For 
example, in “Aspects of the Coverage of the Hurricane” and “Providing Assistance and Aid for 
Fishermen Affected by the Hurricane” AQAP depicts the aftermath of a hurricane in the region, 
large waves rolling into Yemen’s coastline, massive flooding through city streets, even a car 
buried up to its windows in sand and gravel.300 Then, locals in Hadramaut are interviewed 
discussing living in these conditions, e.g. without electricity, needing food, or discussing their 
losses in the aftermath of a hurricane.  
 Interviews with locals occur in five of the six public services videos, an effort on the part 
of AQAP to show itself giving locals a platform to share their grievances, which the group will 
appear to resolve. The videos always end by showcasing AQAP’s effort to fix the problem at 
hand; in the post-hurricane videos, AQAP uses pumps to remove water from local homes, clears 
streets using bulldozers, and distributes at least forty new Japanese motors to fishermen affected 
by the Hurricane.301 A similar sequence occurs in “Aspects of Fixing the Public Electricity 
Lines,” in which AQAP sponsors the repair of an underground power line in a city in 
Hadramaut.302 The purpose of these videos, which resemble poorly-filmed versions of US 
Agency for International Development projects, is evident. AQAP seeks to prove to Yemenis 
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that it will work through the night to repair infrastructure and provide free food and medicine for 
its followers.  
 In an environment in which reliable access to clean water, food, and medicine is almost 
non-existent, AQAP portrays itself as having large quantities of the resources needed to support 
a starving and injured Yemeni population, even if these are likely imports the group seized when 
it controlled Yemen’s third largest port, Mukalla.303 In “Coverage of Efforts in the Distribution 
of Food Baskets,” AQAP films at least three storerooms piled floor-to-ceiling with large white 
bags packed with food.304 Fighters distribute these bags, emblazoned with the circular gold and 
black Ansar al-Sharia logo, to locals who carry the massive bags two people at a time.305 In 
fulfilling zakat, the third pillar of Islam that mandates giving a portion of one’s wealth to charity, 
AQAP redistributes the spoils of controlling Mukalla’s port and provides critical humanitarian 
aid to a starving population. Similarly, in “Aid and Services Project at the Ibn Sīnā Hospital in 
the City of al-Mukallā – Wilāyat Hadramawt,” AQAP fighters unload English-labeled boxes of 
medicine (likely aid seized at the port of Mukalla), install air conditioners, and give the hospitals 
coolers and prayer mats.306 This showing of supplies and free distribution establishes AQAP as a 
good governor, one that is more capable of providing humanitarian aid than the Yemeni 
government itself, whose Social Welfare fund has not disbursed any funds since 2014.307  
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 The outlier in this category is “The Gate of Glory,” published in 2017 well after the other 
five videos in this set.308 This video is a compilation of footage documenting AQAP’s presence 
in Hadramawt, including its initial insurgent operations, established governance, and social 
services. AQAP’s distribution of food and the aid to Ibn Sīnā Hospital is included among the 
footage from the 2016 videos recycled for this video.309 AQAP noticeably contrasts its assets and 
stability in Mukalla to the desperation experienced by Yemeni refugees displaced by the Houthi 
insurgency in the north. By showing the unlivable refugee experience, taking shelter in bombed 
buildings, seeking care in overrun, makeshift hospitals, and having so little food that they must 
slaughter a camel, “The Gate of Glory” seeks to establish AQAP holdings as attractive, well-
resourced destinations in which civilians would be lucky to live.310 AQAP’s implied vast access 
to much-needed resources and attention to public services seeks to draw in a starving and 
vulnerable Yemeni population, signaling a change in AQAP recruiting from sympathetic 
military-aged males to a much larger demographic including men, women, children, and even 
families.  
Recorded Sermons  
 Sermon-style videos make up 44% of the 32-video cache – the largest category in the 
dataset.311 These videos are among the most difficult in the dataset to analyze because they are 
conducted entirely in Arabic and generally do not contain the video sequences and imagery that 
the other genres of AQAP propaganda emphasize.312 The volume of sermon videos in relation to 
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the lower quantity of videos in other categories is understandable; sermon videos require limited 
media production resources. Often limited to footage of only one speaker from a single camera 
and single camera angle, these videos can easily be produced by simply filming an individual 
speaking into the camera, at most filming him from different camera angles and then editing 
these sequences together. Instead of an emphasis on imagery, these videos tend to prioritize 
guidance from AQAP leadership featuring jihadist interpretations of the Qur’an and the 
teachings of Mohammed. Sermon videos are also among the longest in this dataset; most videos 
last over ten minutes. Although they are devoid of the kinetic imagery of much of AQAP 
propaganda, these sermons demonstrate AQAP’s changed identity as a locally-focused actor 
intent upon appealing to the Yemeni population and establishing itself as a good governor. 
 AQAP uses sermon videos, and sometimes simply public statements, to quickly respond 
to local events without directing and composing a longer media product. Some of these videos 
are produced so quickly that they do not use actual footage. Five of the fourteen recorded 
sermons open with an elaborate graphics package built and used repeatedly by AQAP’s 
propaganda team, al-Malāhim Media, but contain no additional footage. 313 Instead, a still image 
of the cleric speaking is often superimposed upon a background with Arabic subtitles, as in 
Batarfi’s “The House of Sa’ud Beginning of the Fall.”314 This quick solution is also used in cases 
in which the speaker was deceased at the time of the video’s production. For example, al-
Rubaysh’s “From the Series: Correction of the Errors #1,” and “The Role of Women in Jihad” 
were both released posthumously, after the AQAP senior leader’s death in an American drone 
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strike on 12 April 2015.315 AQAP also published a forty-episode series “Explanation of the 
Book: Summary of War Politics” from November 2017 to February 2018.316 This random dataset 
includes six lessons from the “Explanation of the Book” series in which AQAP’s deceased leader 
Qasim al-Raymi lectures on civil war politics.317 These lectures feature al-Raymi sitting in front 
of a dark pleated curtain, speaking from notes open on a laptop computer in front of him.318 He 
speaks charismatically, smiling and gesturing as he speaks out to the left and right of the camera 
as if speaking to a crowd around him.319 Besides a quick change of the camera angle from dead 
center to slightly from the left, no other noticeable editing takes place. The limited scope of these 
videos ensures that AQAP’s media team can release a statement responding to an event quickly, 
providing the local public with its view on the event.  
 Overwhelmingly, this category signals an AQAP adaption of traditional Al Qaeda 
“Central” approaches to media production. In many of AQAP’s sermon videos, al-Malāhim 
Media has adopted the visual aesthetic of a textbook Al Qaeda video: an adult cleric speaking 
about Al Qaeda’s response to a certain event or text.320 Recorded sermons given by AQAP’s 
Hārith bin Ghāzī al-Nazārī on sectarian disagreements or Shaykh Khālid bin Umar Batarfi on the 
correct Salafist lifestyle feature the speakers simply in front of a fixed background (a paneled 
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wall and bookcase, respectively) as they speak directly to a camera.321 These appear much in the 
same style as Awlaki’s sermon videos prior to his death in 2011.322 However, as seen in the 
insurgency category, AQAP has also begun to incorporate personal, game-like operations and the 
complex narratives achieved by the Islamic State media into its own propaganda. In this way, 
AQAP has retained the tradition of Al Qaeda senior leadership, while adding its own touch to 
media products in effort to appeal to a local, younger populace.  
  Finally, sermons distributed by AQAP often target demographics that are outside of its 
recruitment audience in the West. In the same way that Anwar al-Awlaki used to signal his 
Yemeni heritage by wearing a jambiya, a traditional curved dagger worn by Yemeni men to 
indicate their masculinity or status, Khālid bin Umar Batarfi’s and Qasim al-Raymi’s sermons 
are shot from the waist up, their jambiya visible in their belts.323 This Yemen-specific cultural 
reference would undoubtedly be recognized by a Yemeni viewer and reflects AQAP’s 
indigenous approach and focus. Also, in “The Role of Women in Jihad,” AQAP seeks to recruit 
and instruct Muslim women in jihad.324 The graphics package present in this video is obviously 
designed to be feminine, with the video’s title scrolling across the screen in shining silver 
lettering on a purple, sparkling background.325 There is no further imagery in the video besides 
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the purple background and twenty-five minutes of a sermon by Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, who had 
been killed by an American drone five months prior to the video’s release.326 The use of this 
sermon after the al-Rubaysh’s death is only further reflective of AQAP’s desire to reach 
additional demographics, as its design reflects an elaborate animation sequence paired with audio 
of an old, recorded sermon in an attempt to bring women into jihad. 
Competition with the Islamic State Yemen Wilayat  
 AQAP videos in direct dialogue with the Islamic State’s Yemen Wilayat (ISY) make up a 
smaller portion of its media output (and just 9% of this dataset), although the production of these 
competitive videos in 2018 and 2019 demonstrates that this is an important new subject in 
AQAP’s propaganda strategy.327 Through these videos, AQAP seeks to undermine the fearsome 
command of the Islamic State and establish itself as completely the opposite of the brutal group 
in order to compete for recruits. For example, in “The Hollywood Reality of al-Baghdadi’s 
Group #2,” AQAP seeks to paint Islamic State fighters as hypocrites and cowards influenced by 
the West.328 The video opens with a mash-up of Islamic State images and video sequences: 
footage from al-Baghdadi’s 2014 public speech in Mosul and a fighter speaking aggressively 
into the camera with a knife, then stills of hostages before execution and severed limbs.329 Then 
the video transitions to nearly twenty minutes of what appears to be an Islamic State blooper 
real. In take after take, the jihadists present their lines awkwardly, constantly needing sheets of 
paper to remember their lines and laughing at their mistakes while they are audibly scolded by 
the production team behind the camera.330 Their companions lazily pick at the grass behind them, 
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one rotund fighter tiring during the long shoot and laying down on his side.331 In a close-up shot, 
a media team member steps in like a touch-up artist to straighten the jihadist’s collar.332 The 
intention behind posting this footage is clear: AQAP seeks to alienate recruits from ISY by 
showing these unintelligent brutes who will hack off limbs but must use notes to deliver their 
lines, while also exposing their staged propaganda as just that: propaganda.333  
 AQAP continues its denigration of the Islamic State by showcasing its brutality. In 
“God Testifies That They Are Liars #2,” locals are interviewed by an al-Hidayyah Media team 
about an attack that killed a child, his bloodied body shown in the video’s first shots.334 The 
interview subjects are clearly Yemeni, holding large quantities of packed qat, leaves of a 
stimulant shrub chewed by 90% of Yemen’s male population, inside their mouths as they speak 
about the child’s death.335 Additionally, in “Testimonies for the Prisoners of the State 
Organization,” AQAP seeks to discredit IS in interviews of prisoners who had fought with 
ISY.336 The video’s ending depicts a still of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the infamous Jordanian thug 
who headed Al Qaeda in Iraq and who was known for his gruesome on-camera beheadings and 
whose initial work became “a majority of ISIS’ playbook,” according to CIA targeter Nada 
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Company, January 28, 2016, https://lionhearttheatre.org/breaking-the-fourth-wall-what-it-is-why-people-avoid-and-
why-some-dont__trashed/.  
334 “New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘God Testifies That They Are Liars #2,’” (0:23-
0:45).  
335 “God Testifies That They Are Liars #2,” (0:45-0:57). On qat, see “The Drug that is Starving Yemen,” The 
Economist, January 4, 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/01/04/the-drug-that-is-
starving-yemen.  
336 “New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Testimonies for the Prisoners from the 




Bakos.337 AQAP’s comparison of ISY with Zarqawi undoubtedly emphasizes the group’s 
bloodlust in an attempt to deter local recruits from siding with ISY.  
Espionage 
 Making up just 3% of the dataset, “Demolishing of the Espionage #4: So Will They Not 
Repent to God,” represents the 32-video cache’s only video in the Espionage category.338 
However, this video offers a wealth of data, spanning over an hour in length, rendering it the 
longest video in the set. This is the only other video in the dataset that includes English 
subtitling, and much like the other subtitled video, “Military Training Camp of the Commander 
Hamzah al-Zinjubari,” this video addresses dual audiences. The series interviews seven “spies” 
who were discovered embedded in AQAP, their emotional commentary revealing very personal 
information about their families and recruitment. Overwhelmingly, the testimonies of these spies 
seek to deter local Yemenis from allowing themselves to be recruited to spy on AQAP. One spy 
speaks of the safety measures he took to protect his life, and an AQAP voiceover interjects to say 
“we wish he had protected his neck and gone to his lord before being caught,” before filming the 
spy being shot in the back of the head.339 Other spies speak of the wretched existence of a traitor, 
one saying:  
If you had one of Hadramout's dogs and asked it, "Would you like to live the life 
of this man," it would have answered you, "By Allah I do not want it or even want 
half of it. I prefer wandering about the trashed of Hadramout, eating from the 
thrown carcasses than to live this kind of living.” We are worse than animals. 
animals have good features.340 
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338 “New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Demolishing of the Espionage #4: So Will 
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them, and it remains possible that they worked for ISY, the Yemen government, or foreign powers seeking to insert 
a source into the group.  
339 “Demolishing of the Espionage #4: So Will They Not Repent to God,” (17:55-18:05).  





The spies also highlight the shame brought to their families, particularly their parents, wife, 
children, or their tribes. This shame can last generations, as a member of AQAP’s interrogation 
committee offers that people typically ask for the name of a child’s grandfather.341 Through these 
interviews, AQAP seeks to deter Yemeni locals from considering spying on the group, promising 
paranoia, shame to all those connected with the individual, and no chance of repentance. 
However, the video’s accessibility to English-speaking audiences is notable in that it allows 
English speakers to see the failure of spies embedded within AQAP by the West. Historical 
imagery of the Knights Templar wearing robes bearing a red cross in the opening sequences, as 
well an AQAP fighter’s testimony that “Spying is connected directly to the crusaders. You are 
collaborating directly with the enemy,” again warns locals of agreeing to work with an invested 
Western audience.342  
Initial Findings  
The 32 video dataset is overwhelmingly designed to appeal to a Yemeni audience. Every 
video collected in this survey is in Arabic; there are only two that have English subtitles. This is 
notable, as AQAP propaganda is best known in academia for Inspire and Awlaki’s western 
influence.343 The use of Arabic almost exclusively, along with AQAP’s sensitivity to Yemen’s 
political, historic, and humanitarian concerns points to a different target audience than often 
attributed to AQAP. AQAP’s propaganda narrative often capitalizes on the Yemeni people’s 
already widespread distrust of the government due to corruption and the government’s alignment 
with coalition forces that carelessly target civilians. AQAP also seeks to publicize its operations 
against the Houthi insurgency and independent militias, proving to Yemen’s Sunnis that it will 
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oppose Shia expansionism and forcible governance. AQAP’s local infrastructure projects and 
humanitarian aid obviously are used to appeal to a local population which would benefit from 
such public services, particularly in the climate of the civil war. The comparison AQAP draws 
between itself and ISY indicates its strategy is to edge out the Islamic State wilayat for recruits, 
and the espionage video in the dataset specifically seeks to deter locals from falling prey to being 
recruited as a spy. Even recorded sermons with limited imagery have been tailored to a Yemeni 
audience. Overwhelmingly, these videos demonstrate AQAP’s targeting of an entirely new 
audience: the average Yemeni civilian, including men, women, and children, who seeks security, 






Chapter 4: Analysis 
 
“We don’t fight only with weapons – Allah is always with us.”  
-Hamza al-Zinjibari, leader of Ansar al-Sharia, 2012344 
 
Trends in Audience  
 In analyzing jihadist propaganda, it is essential to consider the primary audience intended 
for the video messages produced by a terrorist group. Groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State 
have long demonstrated a “heightened sophistication in the strategic crafting of their online 
appeals.”345 These videos are not amateur. Whether it be appealing to potential sympathizers 
with intent to recruit, to locals with intent to win hearts and minds, or to a Western audience with 
intent to incite fear, the narrative portrayed has been carefully shot frame-by-frame. AQAP is no 
different. It’s video messages have been crafted, albeit with lower production quality than that of 
the Islamic State, to persuade a specific audience. The intended audience dominates a video’s 
creation, influencing what imagery is included and what is left out, what narrative arc is used, 
and the overall purpose of a propaganda video. Without identifying this audience, one cannot 
interpret the video as it was produced to be viewed and thus understand the weight of the video’s 
persuasive argument. Assessments of the intended audience have been made as a direct result of 
the imagery and narrative depicted in each video. 
 Overwhelmingly, the videos in each category of the dataset have been tailored to a local, 
Yemeni audience, with two notable exceptions. Again, 30 videos in the 32 video dataset have 
been conducted entirely in Arabic, sometimes with Arabic subtitling. AQAP’s Western-oriented 
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media proves AQAP has the capacity and intent to publish English media products, but the group 
has intentionally not used English in these videos. Therefore, use of or translation to English was 
deemed unnecessary for the audience of these videos. This automatically narrows the intended 
audience to viewers fluent in Arabic. The lack of English language used in itself cannot be the 
crux of the argument for a specifically Yemeni primary audience. It is simply a notable (if not 
surprising) occurrence in the propaganda of a group that is infamous for its Western-tailored 
media products.  
 Investigation of each of the five categories demonstrates the tailoring of each video (with 
two notable exceptions) for a local, Yemeni audience including not only military-aged males, but 
also children, women, and elderly citizens. In particular, insurgency videos tend to use video-
game motifs to appeal to a young Yemeni audience interested in opposing the Houthi insurgency 
as well as government forces – a distinct appeal to locals of Yemen’s southern provinces where 
AQAP holds the majority of its territory. Local public services videos appeal to a broader 
Yemeni audience, assuring locals of all ages that AQAP will provide the social services needed 
to take care of its citizens. Sermon videos also appeal to a broad Yemeni audience, explaining 
AQAP’s ideological justification behind interfering in the civil war. These videos also encourage 
a broad demographic, including women, to align themselves with AQAP’s jihad. Competition 
with ISY videos seek to sway recruits to join AQAP and edge out the Islamic State wilayat in 
Yemen, clearly appealing to local Yemenis in the Al Bayda governorate. The espionage video in 
this dataset clearly seeks to deter Yemenis who, being from Yemen, could insinuate themselves 
into AQAP to gather information from agreeing to act as spies.346 
Ansar al-Sharia  
                                                




 Ansar al-Sharia insurgency videos seek to build rapport with the Yemeni people through 
the representation of AQAP as enemy of Yemeni government forces, the Saudi-led coalition’s 
backing of the Hadi government, and the Houthis.347 At first glance, these videos’ use of video-
game imagery such as the first-person shooter perspective, drone footage, and graphics seem to 
appeal to a young male audience.348 And indeed, these references can only be recognized by a 
young, majority-male demographic who have played video games such as “Call of Duty” or who 
are familiar with video games more generally.349 These videos appeal specifically to a young 
male Yemeni audience because the “missions” portrayed, the actions that the viewer imagines 
himself doing, play on Yemeni civil war politics and the widespread anti-government sentiment 
in Yemen’s southern provinces due to devastating coalition airstrikes and the government’s 
violent opposition to the south’s attempts at secession.  
 In the same way that video game references can be best recognized by a person that 
played or was familiar with the games, the nuances of Yemen’s complicated internal politics can 
be best understood by a Yemeni. In these videos, AQAP isn’t targeting civilians, but assaulting 
government buildings, government-backed militias like al-Sayyid’s southern popular resistance 
committees, and Houthis. In this way, AQAP distances itself from both sides in the civil war, 
violently opposing both the government and the Houthi insurgency. Instead, AQAP seeks to 
represent itself as the champion of local Yemenis, protecting them from the Houthi insurgency 
while opposing a government whose allied coalition has actively terrorized the Yemeni people, 
further alienating southern separatists. The inclusion of interviews of distraught women and 
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locals in this category points to this, as the viewer can imagine himself actively protecting them 
and avenging their grievances.350 While the videos might appeal to an Arabic-speaking viewer 
who enjoys video games and thus encourage his recruitment, there is more to the intent behind 
this category of videos. Rather than simply appealing to a young male audience, these videos 
seek to win the hearts and minds of the Yemeni people as much as they encourage young 
Yemenis to align themselves with AQAP for a video game-like adventure.  
 The “Military Training Camp of Commander Hamzah al-Zinjubari” video in this 
category is a notable outlier in the insurgency category, and serves as a counterargument because 
it appeals to at least two audiences, neither of which is the Yemeni people.351 The primary 
intended audience for this video is military-aged males sympathetic to the jihadist cause. Much 
like a television commercial encouraging Americans to join the Army, AQAP promises recruits 
that they will become part of a disciplined, elite fighting force. Using flashy action sequences, 
inspiring rhetoric in Arabic (translated to English in subtitles), and a call to jihad from other 
fighters, AQAP seeks to fill its ranks.352 However, there is no indication in this video that AQAP 
seeks to recruit Yemenis only. On the contrary, al Qaeda training camps in Yemen have 
historically trained foreign fighters who defect from their home country and travel to the Middle 
East to join the jihadist cause.353 The author has found no credible argument to suggest this video 
is tailored to local Yemeni recruits as opposed to Pakistani recruits, or Somalia recruits, or 
American recruits.  
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 Unlike many of the videos in this dataset, this video also addresses a secondary audience: 
the West. As just one of two videos in the dataset that makes use of English subtitles, this video 
includes a speech from a “special operations” fighter from the camp specifically addressed to the 
United States.354 This is a clear response to the American airstrike in which al-Zinjubari, 
commander of Ansar al-Sharia, was killed on 4 February 2016.355 Having lost a revered leader, 
AQAP seeks to intimidate the West, to prove that even without its leader it is still training special 
operations forces with the intent of harming the West.  
 The fighter claims, “O America, if you are truly men then descend upon the battle and the 
field of men. We will surely taste much greater than what you tasted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Somalia.” 356 This statement clearly criticizes American drone usage in Yemen while 
simultaneously recruiting. It implies that America has been cowardly and a “paper tiger” in its 
refusal to commit soldiers to the battlefield, instead hiding behind expensive technology like 
unmanned aerial vehicles. Meanwhile, AQAP communicates to a potential recruit that by joining 
the group, he will be a “real” man, as opposed to an American drone operator killing from 
thousands of miles away, for example. The fighter also implies a warning: that despite these 
drone attacks, Yemen will be the next war on terrorism lost by the United States.  
Local Public Services 
 Local public service videos produced by AQAP clearly seek to appeal to a Yemeni 
audience.357 What would AQAP hope to gain from a Western audience (particularly one 
unsympathetic to jihad) viewing one of its local public services videos? A Western audience 
likely would be underwhelmed by images of AQAP fixing of public power lines, or clearing of 
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roads after a hurricane.358 With some exceptions, an American or British viewer would consider 
these services expected and necessary – a critical task to be completed and resolved by the 
government as soon as possible. To an American, the construction that appears in the video 
might even appear inferior to your average neighborhood power company crew fixing a power 
line on the side of the road.  
 But consider the context of Yemen, a country in which at least 15 million people (roughly 
half of the population) live without electricity.359 To a Yemeni audience, electricity is a precious 
commodity – and one that the population is continuously at risk of losing due to the civil war. In 
fact, the United Nations estimated that electricity was available to only 10% of the population at 
the beginning of the conflict.360 The Houthi insurgency’s forcible seizure of Yemen’s capital, 
Sana’a, in 2014 and continued hold on the city has resulted in complete devastation of the power 
grid. No state power supply exists in the city, which is home to almost three million Yemenis.361 
Paired with the complete lack of government capacity for providing public services, Yemenis are 
reliant upon the aid provided by humanitarian organizations, whose projects in Yemen are 
limited at best due to the constant violence of the civil war.362 Thus, AQAP’s fixing of power 
lines is hugely impactful to a Yemeni audience.  
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 A similar argument can be made in analyzing AQAP’s video “Coverage of Efforts in the 
Distribution of Food Baskets.”363 The distribution of food is a hugely impactful selling point in a 
country in which 16 million people are starving and almost 40% of children under the age of five 
are underweight.364 These videos were likely not intended for a mainstream Western audience, as 
AQAP surely does not seek to convince the West of its philanthropic good deeds. It is possible 
that these videos might appeal to Al Qaeda sympathizers in the West who care deeply about 
AQAP’s treatment of locals. However, the local narratives and public services portrayed in these 
videos are intended (and much better-suited) to persuade a Yemeni audience, and they noticeably 
lack the “Westernization” present in counterexamples like “Military Training Camp of 
Commander Hamzah al-Zinjubari” video. Rather, through these videos, AQAP seeks to win over 
locals by identifying itself as not only capable of meeting their needs, but working to improve or 
restore a degree of their quality of life (even masking the caveat that they are governed by a 
terrorist organization that intends to impose Sharia law).  
Recorded Sermons  
 Recorded sermon videos released by AQAP are notably tailored to a Yemeni audience.365 
For example, Raymi’s forty-episode series “Explanation of the Book: Summary of War Politics” 
is an obvious choice, its title indicating its purpose to explain AQAP’s ideological view of the 
civil war to the Yemeni people.366 While it is possible that the translation of this series would 
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unearth a different audience, the ideological aspect of the series seems to reflect AQAP’s 
intention to offer its dialogue on the war to Yemeni civilians. It hardly needs to explain its 
violent involvement to the West, nor does it need to justify attacking the Shia Houthi insurgency. 
 Further, it seems clear that cultural references in these sermon videos are intentionally 
being used to establish the speaker as a Yemeni in effort to build rapport with a Yemeni 
audience. Bartarfi and Raymi’s wearing of the Yemeni jambiya lends them a sense of authority 
that viewers outside of Yemen who do not understand the meaning or status behind the weapon 
would not observe.367 Al-Rubaysh’s role as expounder of Islamic Law for AQAP likely indicates 
his sermons encouraging jihad against Zaydi Shia and explaining the role of women in jihad are 
intended for a local audience.368 Although al-Rubaysh wears the Saudi red and white checked 
ghutra, a mark of his heritage, his harsh criticism of the Saudi regime and status as a senior 
leader in Yemen following his escape from Saudi custody in 2006 indicates his viable influence 
over a local Yemeni, not Saudi, audience.369 
Competition with ISY 
 AQAP videos addressing ISY ultimately seek to appeal to the Yemeni audience that 
might consider joining the Islamic State’s wilayat in Yemen.370 AQAP takes care to imply the 
brutality of the Islamic State through the testimonies of prisoners, cuts of violent Islamic State 
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propaganda, and the group’s association with Al Qaeda in Iraq’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. AQAP 
knows from its own prior experience that forcibly implementing Sharia Law and its cruel 
punishments infuriates the Yemeni populace, so much so that Yemeni civilians rose up to fight 
alongside Hadi’s government forces to drive AQAP out of its territorial holdings in 2012.371 
Instead, AQAP relies on its new persona as a benevolent group interested in protecting the 
people, establishing itself as an alternative to the Islamic State’s bloody operations. It is natural 
that ISY and AQAP, being based in Yemen, would recruit from the local population to fill their 
ranks. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude the primary audience for these videos are Yemenis, 
particularly as AQAP’s arguments (somewhat hypocritically) rely upon the Yemeni disdain for 
violent terrorist organizations that brutalize the people, not just the government or Houthi 
insurgency.   
Espionage  
 The lone espionage video in the dataset, although initially tailored to suit a Yemeni 
audience, also serves as a counterargument because it noticeably addresses a Western 
audience.372 In this video, the discovered spies overwhelmingly speak of the shame they’ve 
brought to their families and tribes, actively asking viewers not to adopt the “wretched life” of a 
spy.373 Their clear tribal ties, and fact that the majority of men interviewed are wearing of a 
Yemeni shemagh (turban), indicate their Yemeni heritage.374 It seems unlikely that a spy could 
penetrate a group like AQAP, which is recognized for its ties to local tribes and its homegrown 
nature, unless he were of Yemeni (or perhaps Saudi) heritage. Therefore, AQAP likely intends 
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this video primary for a Yemeni audience in order to deter locals from becoming spies with a 
chilling warning that they should repent to God for their sins.375 
 However, this video also has a clear secondary audience: the Western “crusaders” the 
video mentions throughout its hour-long commentary.376 This is the only other video in the 
dataset that includes English subtitles, making the video accessible to a non-Arabic speaking 
audience. The video contains noticeable imagery of the crusades, crusaders riding horses 
followed by a map showing the routes of the crusaders into the Middle East from Europe, 
directly comparing the infiltration of spies into AQAP to the invasion of the crusaders.377 This 
imagery would certainly appeal to a broader audience that is critical of Western (and particularly 
American) intervention in the Middle East and resonate with Yemenis who harbor anti-American 
sentiment. The execution of a repentant spy in the video, while a warning for other spies, also 
shows the spy’s handler what has become of his or her agent.378 Many of the spies claim they 
were threatened or coerced into spying against their will, labeling their recruiters as malicious 
“pigs” guilty of exploiting vulnerable Yemenis.379 In this way, AQAP seeks to communicate to 
the spies’ recruiters, possibly in American agencies, that the blood of the spies is on their hands.  
 It is possible that the “spies” in this video are actors and that the video seeks to portray 
AQAP as having discovered traitors within its ranks. If this is the case, the video may be 
intended to flaunt AQAP’s counterintelligence and deter the further espionage by locals by 
showing spies will be caught. However, this also draws attention to group’s domestic and 
international status. By portraying itself as wary of espionage, AQAP insinuates that it is a 
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powerful threat, one that holds information and plans worth risking planting an agent inside the 
group to obtain. Additionally, this may in turn seek to manipulate the Islamic State into believing 
it has been infiltrated by spies and devoting resources to finding them.  
Trends in Purpose 
 Having established the audience of each category of videos, it is also imperative to 
investigate the purpose of these videos in relation to the current events in Yemen at the 
approximate time of the videos’ release. This analysis seeks to explain why certain categories 
were popular during specific years of the civil war, or why videos seem to respond to events that 
occurred earlier. For example, why were sermon videos overwhelming concentrated in 2017, 
making up two-thirds of that year’s selected dataset? Why did AQAP begin to publish a higher 
number of videos directly addressing ISY in 2018? Investigation of civil war politics and events 
provide context for the trends in this AQAP video dataset. Further, this analysis reiterates the 
importance of analysis of videos as an integral part of open source intelligence when seeking to 
learn about and counter terrorist groups.380  
 2015-2016: Height of AQAP Territorial Power  
 Videos from the local public services and Ansar al-Sharia insurgency categories 
dominate the first years of the civil war, making up ten of the fifteen videos in this dataset 
released between those two years. These videos coincide with the height of AQAP’s power in 
Yemen’s southern governorates, as Ansar al-Sharia seized large swathes of territory in Abyan, 
Shabwa, Taiz, and Hadramaut, all governorates in which AQAP produced local public service or 
insurgency videos (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Map of AQAP’s influence in Yemen, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015.381 
Sharp’s 2015 primer on the civil war in Yemen in documents AQAP’s seizure of Al Mukalla in 
April, noting that al Qaeda integrated itself into the local administration and “refrained from 
imposing strict interpretations of Islamic law” in order to build rapport with the local 
population.382 In fact, the videos indicate AQAP’s presence even further east than the map 
(Figure 1) suggests, depicting battles in Taiz and Al-Hudaydah, where AQAP was known to 
have fought and successfully spread its influence by 2016.383 AQAP’s insurgency videos 
highlight its actions in 2015 and 2016, demonstrating its success in seizing territory while 
battling both Houthis and government forces. The subsequent public services videos are a logical 
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development of AQAP’s strategy, as these implicitly demonstrate that the group will not impose 
harsh punishments (as it did in 2012), but instead use the revenue it collected from raiding banks 
and taxing ports within its newly-seized territories to give back to the populace under its control.  
 These two years also represent some of the bloodiest in the war, as well as the escalation 
of Yemen into a full-blown humanitarian crisis. The Saudi-led coalition’s air campaign, known 
as Operation Decisive Storm, developed into a ground conflict, resulting in the deaths of 5,000 
people, almost half of which were civilians.384 The coalition’s airstrikes quickly began to draw 
criticism for violating the laws of war in 2015, as the coalition targeted hospitals, schools, 
funerals, and Yemen’s already “bare bones” industries.385 A September 2015 airstrike killed at 
least 80 civilians celebrating a wedding.386 Civilians also faced rapidly accelerating food 
shortages in 2015, with 25 million Yemenis estimated to be “food insecure” at the time.387 The 
coalition’s de facto blockade of Yemen only further exacerbated the man-made crisis in 2016, 
with humanitarian aid efforts limited to the point that UNICEF estimated one child died in 
Yemen every ten minutes due to malnutrition and preventable diseases.388  
 In 2015 and 2016 the political power vacuum, devastating humanitarian crisis, and civil 
war put Yemen into its most vulnerable state since the 2011 Arab Spring.389 At a time in which 
Yemeni civilians were actively terrorized by Houthis and a coalition backing their own 
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government (and on the brink of mass starvation), Yemen’s Sunni population seemingly had no 
ally in Yemen.  
 AQAP fed on this vulnerability, establishing its most widespread presence in Yemen to 
date.390 With this expansion, AQAP saw its greatest opportunity to influence and build rapport 
with Yemeni civilians in the hopes of maintaining its holdings and avenging its losses in 2012. 
These videos are a direct response to those aims. AQAP’s insurgency and public services videos 
attempt to paint AQAP as the champion of the Yemeni people at a time in which it had none. By 
advertising itself as meeting the most basic human needs (food, water, electricity) and fighting 
against the Houthis and the coalition, AQAP recreated itself as a group that could win the hearts 
and minds of Yemenis without selling them on the group’s jihadist ideology.  
 2017: Reeling under US Counterterrorism Efforts 
 2017 signifies a turning point for AQAP during the Yemen civil war. Although 2017 
holds the highest number of videos in the breakdown of the dataset by year (nine videos), six of 
the videos are relatively low quality recorded sermon videos.391 Of the two insurgency videos 
from the first half of the year, only one shows a battle in Abyan, while the others are interviews 
with Houthi prisoners – a stark contrast to AQAP’s multitude of insurgent videos in 2015 and 
2016.392 The lone local public services video documents services in Al-Mukalla using recycled 
footage, although AQAP had been expelled by the Yemeni army backed by American and 
Emirati troop support in April 2016.393 
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 The increased production of recorded sermon videos in 2017 is likely a result of AQAP’s 
significant losses in territory due to push back from southern militias sponsored by the UAE and 
the United States via drone strikes. In 2017, American drone strikes in Yemen peaked at 127, 
escalating dramatically from 21 in 2015 and 37 in 2016.394 The strikes were undeniably 
concentrated in AQAP strongholds such as al-Bayda, Shabwa, and Abyan and killed a key 
AQAP leader, bomb maker Ibrahim al-Asiri.395 2017 is also the first year in the civil war in 
which the covert involvement of American Special Forces in Yemen came to the attention of 
American media.396 President Trump authorized the Navy’s SEAL Team 6 raid of an AQAP 
stronghold in al-Bayda governorate in January 2017, the almost hour-long firefight resulting in 
the death of Chief Petty Officer William Owens as well as fourteen AQAP militants.397 This 
increase in American counterterrorism operations in Yemen likely severely impacted AQAP’s 
production capabilities, forcing its militants to rely on the use of previously-shot footage and 
easily-produced sermon videos. As discussed, sermon videos can be easily shot and produced, 
often only requiring a pre-made opening graphic before an unchanging frontal shot of a speaker 
as he gives a sermon. These videos could easily be shot and produced in a makeshift studio, 
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bypassing the dangerous necessity of filming lengthy action sequences and public service 
projects. Due to the increased pressure on AQAP in 2017, one can understand the group’s shift 
towards ideological videos not only for the purpose of indoctrinating viewers in the group’s 
radical interpretation of Islam, but also out of operational necessity.  
 2018-2019: Rise of the Competition with ISY  
 It is likely that reduced capabilities following the decimation from drone strikes in 2017 
resulted in the decline in video production over 2018, 2019, and so far in 2020. The years 2018 
and 2019 represent the beginning of the comparative drop in AQAP media production, as the 
dataset includes five videos from 2018 and only two videos from 2019. The three recorded 
sermon videos from 2018 are simply a continuation of Ramyi’s “Explanation of the Book: 
‘Summary of War Politics,’” series.398 The production of these extremely low-quality, 
unchanging videos of Raymi in the same clothing, looking at notes on a laptop in front of him, 
suggests this footage was shot prior to Raymi’s first episode of the series in November 2017 and 
released in segments later. The lone Ansar al-Sharia video in 2019 reuses footage from earlier 
2016 public services videos, combining this with training and operational sequences to celebrate 
AQAP’s past success and remind these regions of the services it provided.399 However, AQAP 
had lost much of this territory, and about half of its overall holdings, by the summer of 2018. 400 
This video’s features in Shabwa, Al Bayda, and Abyan likely attempt to assert AQAP’s 
continued (if limited) presence in these governorates (see Figure 5).401 
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Figure 5: Al Qaeda Presence in Yemen, July 2018, Congressional Research Service402 
 AQAP’s competition with ISY comes to the forefront of AQAP media in 2018 and 2019 
likely due to the physical violence that broke out between the groups in 2018. Although the 
Islamic State claimed a wilayat in Al-Bayda as early as November 2014, this rise in media is 
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likely a direct result of the bloody battles that ensued in July 2018 after ISY captured a group of 
thirteen AQAP fighters and local tribesmen.403 AQAP interpreted this as a declaration of war, 
and armed clashes have persisted alongside a media battle in which AQAP seeks to discredit ISY 
as a foreign group that lusts for blood.404 In return, ISY claims AQAP has worked with Yemen’s 
governmental security forces and has “been weak against the Houthis.”405 Open conflict between 
the groups, including almost 30 attacks by September 2019, has continued as the two groups 
battle for Al-Bayda.406 The three videos between 2018 and 2019, therefore, all seek to discredit 
ISY in Yemen in response to the rising conflict between the groups.407  
 AQAP’s media competition with ISY raises the question: which group produces the 
highest quality, most effective videos?408 AQAP videos from this dataset, and throughout the 256 
video dataset, display an overall low quality of production. The resolution is grainy, like a video 
shot with an older iPhone or even a handheld stand-alone video camera. The editing of the 
videos is noticeable, including “fade out” transitions that call to mind the animations of 
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PowerPoint slides. The blurring of every AQAP fighter’s face (presumably in an effort to 
preserve operational security) is visually jarring, though the features of fighters that have died 
and leaders giving sermons are shown. Even AQAP’s longer narrative sequences, such as those 
in insurgency videos, can be disjointed with dark lighting, blurred shots (due to the camera being 
so far from the target or poor focus of the camera), and repetitive short clips of caravans or 
mortar rounds being fired. If you only compare quality of production, ISY videography is 
superior in virtually every case. Consider, for example, the quality of the ISY footage AQAP 
includes in its “The Hollywood Reality of al-Baghdādī’s Group #2,” and the “Hollywood visual 
style,” professional lighting, and crystal-clear resolution of the Islamic State is visible even given 
that the video is a blooper real.409  
 But if the production of ISY propaganda is so visually superior to AQAP, why is there 
such a bitter competition between the two in which AQAP thought to be on top? The answer 
seems to come down to the accessibility of these videos to Yemenis. Well before the civil war in 
Yemen started, the infrastructure of Yemen was severely limited. When the Houthis seized 
Sana’a and Yemen’s state-owned internet provider, YemenNet, in 2014, the insurgency 
altogether disabled internet service in anti-Houthi strongholds and conflict zones and 
implemented censorship and surveillance in areas under its control.410 Although alternative 
private companies including coalition-built AdenNet provide limited 3G coverage, the steep 
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prices are virtually unpayable.411 In broadband speed, Yemen ranks last in the world, the 
coverage requiring more than 30 hours to download a 5GB movie.412  
 It is evident, however, that while the country endures poor telecommunications 
infrastructure, [because] its citizens have had access to online media on cell phones via wireless 
internet from cafes or private networks, they are able to view these materials, but only in a 
compressed, lower-quality version. Subscriptions to mobile cellular phones number over 15 
million, suggesting more than 50% of Yemenis have access to a cell phone.413 Further, Al-
Monitor reports that limited connectivity has been restored in Yemen following a week-long 
internet outage in January 2020 when a submarine cable was interrupted in the Suez Canal, 
causing more than 80% of international internet capacities to go out of service temporarily.414 
Thus, it is likely that the majority of these propaganda videos would have been viewed on a cell 
phone. The already limited connectivity of 3G, which was replaced by the 500 times faster next 
generation 4G network in the United States in the early 2000s, will alter the quality of a video no 
matter the quality of its original production, as will the compression of a video onto a cellular 
device.415 Therefore, the author finds the production quality of video propaganda in Yemen to be 
less important in the argument regarding the product’s efficacy as opposed to narrative content or 
local appeals present in the video – an area in which AQAP is vastly superior to ISY. AQAP is 
successful despite its handicap in producing the Hollywood visual style of ISY’s videos because 
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of the unique context, which produces very specific practical constraints limiting the quality of 
every group’s propaganda at the point at which the viewer engages with it.  
 2020: Outing Espionage  
 AQAP’s turn to the espionage category is curious. This video may signal an uptick in 
spies discovered within the organization, either recruited by ISY or other sources. Elizabeth 
Kendall discusses a similar 2018 video, the first in the “Demolishing of the Espionage” series, in 
which “sobbing operatives confess to having been sent to infiltrate AQAP to exploit rifts and 
stoke conflict,” suggesting these spies could have been recruited by ISY.416 Kendall rightly links 
the spy confessions to AQAP’s ousting of embedded spies who likely provided the inside 
information needed for success of counterterrorism drone strikes, and this is certainly consistent 
with the implication of spies recruited by the West given the video’s crusader imagery.417  
 Finally, this video features an extremely recognizable uptick in production quality on the 
part of AQAP. “Demolishing of the Espionage #4: So Will They Not Repent to God” features 
eye-catching moving graphic sequences, higher picture quality, and the use of found footage 
uncharacteristic of the other videos in this dataset.418 Kendall writes that the “better produced 
than the AQAP norm” series was outsourced to an external professional within the jihadist 
movement.419 This is an interesting development in AQAP media, and one that may suggest that 
AQAP’s media output has improved due to the use as outsourcing as a result of the group’s own 
capabilities being reduced by drone strikes. This is only one of many areas in which AQAP’s 
media production warrants further close examination.  
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 It would be irresponsible to argue that AQAP has shifted its focus from the West entirely. 
AQAP claimed responsibility for the attack on Naval Air Station Pensacola on 6 December 
2019, in which 2nd Lt. Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani, a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force, 
shot three and wounded eight.420 The Department of Justice and FBI concluded that the attack 
was an act of terrorism after finding evidence Alshamrani was motivated by a jihadist ideology, 
including a social media statement almost identical to one made previously by Anwar al-
Awlaki.421 The connection to AQAP was only known after Qasim al-Raymi claimed the attack in 
an audio recording, citing a copy of Alshamrani’s will and correspondence between he and the 
group.422 AQAP later released an 18-minute video praising Alshamrani’s attack, and celebrating 
his martyrdom as a “hero.”423 The video ends by calling for Muslims in the West to wage 
independent jihad, showing a succession of attacks inspired by AQAP, including the Boston 
Marathon Bombing, all depicted via security camera footage, and directing viewers to Inspire for 
instructions on how to commit similar attacks.424 It is undeniable that AQAP currently harbors 
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aspirations to strike the United States and the wider West, though its reduced capacities seem to 
have limited its ability to stage an attack on the West emanating out of Yemen and fueled its 
support instead for lone wolf attacks.  
 Further, independent research conducted by the author in support of an unpublished 
article proves that the legacy of Anwar al-Awlaki continues to inspire terrorism in the United 
States, whether AQAP’s primary focus rests on the West or not.425 Despite Awlaki’s death by 
American drone strike on 30 September 2011, his lectures remain a consistent factor in the 
radicalization of Westerners inspired to stage attacks in their home country or to leave their 
homes to join terrorist organizations abroad. In reading the affidavits of terrorists prosecuted in 
the United States for their ties to the Islamic State, ten of 42 individuals surveyed were found to 
have listened to or viewed Anwar al-Awlaki’s speeches or videos, or to have read Inspire 
magazine. A larger survey of 98 individuals radicalized in the West revealed eighteen additional 
individuals with ties to Awlaki’s media. This data cannot boast that Awlaki or AQAP had its 
hand in the radicalization process of a majority of Americans arrested – in fact, the combined 
percentage is about 19%. However, compared to the other notable jihadist ideologues who 
appeared in the study Awlaki’s media was mentioned the most, as opposed to Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi whose name appeared in eight of 48 radicalized cases investigated by the author, and 
seven of 98 cases investigated by prior researchers. This raw data indicates AQAP’s continued 
role in radicalizing Westerns and inspiring attacks through Awlaki’s legacy.  
 This paper does not claim that AQAP has turned its eye away from the West entirely. It is 
clear that AQAP propaganda has incited considerable violence well beyond the death of al-
Awlaki. However, the surveyed video data from 2015-2020 indicates that AQAP video messages 
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overwhelmingly seek to appeal to an Arabic-speaking, local Yemeni audience. In each video 
category, the primary audience addressed is locals, with an intent to show a new face of Al 
Qaeda – one that is not brutal like the Islamic State, but philanthropic and protective of locals in 
the wake of the Houthi insurgency and indiscriminate coalition strikes. The overwhelming 
domestic-focus in AQAP’s media is representative of its current strategy: to win the hearts and 
minds of Yemenis in an effort to align itself with Yemen’s tribes, cement its territorial holdings 













Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications  
 
There is support from vast areas of people here in Yemen whether it be in 
Abeedah or Dahm or Wailah or Hashid or Bayqal or Khawlaan, whether it be in 
Hadramaut or in Abyan or in Sahbwa or Aden or Sana’a.   
-Anwar al-Awlaki, interviewed by Dar Al Murabiteen Publications,  
May 23, 2010426 
Lessons Learned about AQAP Propaganda 
 The dataset surveyed suggests that a majority of AQAP video propaganda (in this case, 
30 of 32 videos) has been specifically tailored to and intended for a local Yemeni audience, a 
radically different approach from the Western-focused media products which scholars have 
previously studied so meticulously. While AQAP’s videography has shifted through different 
themes in response to the events of the civil war, over the six-year period AQAP has always 
placed an emphasis on appealing to the Yemeni population with an apparent intent to win over 
the population and spread its influence. The investigation of this dataset of AQAP propaganda 
dataset has revealed a shift in recruitment goals of AQAP in the region.  
 While AQAP has been recognized for its Al Qaeda Central-like international focus and 
focus on Western recruiting, the domestic imagery present in AQAP’s propaganda actually 
shows a preference for local recruiting and relationships. AQAP’s strategy of holding and 
governing territory in the southern governorates of Yemen during the civil war signals a larger 
ideological shift in AQAP and a local reality – seizing of territory to be ruled under Sharia law 
by AQAP. Seeking to exploit the population’s desperation, AQAP has abandoned the Western 
focus instilled by Al Qaeda senior leadership in favor of a local approach that will allow it to 
amass territorial control and human capital. 
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 In 2015-2016, AQAP sought to take advantage of the political power vacuum created by 
the forcible exile of President Hadi and the chaos resulting from the Houthi insurgency’s taking 
of Sana’a. Production peaked during this time, as AQAP held large portions of Yemen’s 
southern governorates. In this period, the group’s propaganda demonstrated increasingly modern 
themes, such as the video-game aesthetic, that build off a significant development from Al Qaeda 
propaganda in the age of Osama bin Laden and Awlaki. Its propaganda showcased its operations 
in the south to recruit young Yemenis to join it against the government forces, militias, and 
Houthis, while simultaneously showing how it protected and served citizens in its territories. The 
emphasis on insurgency and local public services videos during this time period are appropriate, 
as these videos showcasing Ansar al-Sharia’s (and AQAP’s) jihad against government forces and 
Houthis alongside their philanthropic social services are well suited to appeal to a war-torn, 
secessionist southern population.  
 Even in 2017, when AQAP’s operational and media capabilities were undoubtedly 
limited by an onslaught of American drone strikes, AQAP pushed out easy-to-produce, 
traditional sermon videos to continue to spread its influence and prove it had survived. This is an 
essential moment in the study of AQAP propaganda – one that demonstrates the importance of 
studying video propaganda as evidence of a group’s fluctuating capabilities. It signifies an 
atrophied capability in AQAP production, a regression from the video game-like, detailed 
narratives of its insurgency videos. Simultaneously, this year serves as the base point from which 
future research may observe AQAP’s recovered capabilities.  
 Media output has decreased significantly since 2017. At the same time there has been a 
new focus on seeking to undermine ISY while weeding out any spies embedded in the 




these videos are more visually stimulating than the 2017 sermon videos, demonstrating a 
recovery in propaganda quality and narrative. AQAP’s focus turned to competition with the 
Islamic State in 2018-2019 as physical violence broke out between the groups in Al-Bayda 
governorate. While unable to match ISY’s quality (except when using captured ISY footage), 
AQAP plays on its tribal ties and portrays ISY’s brutality to sway recruits. Its use of captured 
Islamic State blooper footage against the group is both clever and comical, and a play that 
demonstrates to Yemenis that the brutal fighters are just that: brutal and brainless.  
 The turn to espionage may signal AQAP’s intended retribution for the deadly drone 
attacks that decimated its structure in 2017. The development of AQAP outsourcing specific 
video projects in 2020 such as this espionage series may signal that AQAP production 
capabilities are still diminished. However, outsourcing seems to have allowed AQAP to recover 
or even exceed the threshold of its past production quality. The significant drop in production 
quantity from 2018 to the present may be a side-effect of AQAP’s reduced capabilities and 
outsourcing. Still, AQAP propaganda is not dead, even if it is forced to shift to an emphasis on 
(outsourced) quality over quantity approach.  
Implications  
 This research is a testament to the importance of answering these questions: Why does 
research on AQAP in Yemen matter? Why should policymakers care about an Al Qaeda affiliate 
in the age of the Islamic State? Finally, why should Western nations care about what is 
happening to the populace of Yemen?  
1. While Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may no longer be a threat to the West, it is a 
serious and dangerous threat to the population of Yemen – all while existing as one of 




Yemeni population would be hostile towards AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia because of its 
cruelty in 2011-2012 “until it is their only alternative.”427 The conditions of the Yemen 
civil war, open hostilities that make no distinction between combatant and civilian, a 
massive famine, and complete lack of government authority, have brought the people of 
Yemen to a new threshold of vulnerability. AQAP has actively sought to weaponize this 
vulnerable, starving population terrorized by its own government and a minority rebel 
insurgency. It wins the Yemeni people’s trust and backing simply by providing food and 
restoring vital human necessities, allowing AQAP to spread its influence among Yemeni 
tribes that otherwise would (perhaps violently) oppose the group.  
2. The United States has been, and likely will continue to be, active in Yemen against 
AQAP through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and US Special Forces unless 
AQAP is deemed neutralized as a threat. The attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 by the 
predecessors of AQAP, followed by the multiple attempts to attack the West emanating 
out of Yemen, proved AQAP’s credibility as a threat to the West in the past. Further, the 
lone wolf attacks inspired by AQAP (and Awlaki) in the West, and the Pensacola 
shooting, make clear that AQAP still retains aspirations to strike the West, even if it no 
longer has the capacity to stage an attack from Yemen. American drones and forces will 
likely continue to operate in Yemen, particularly facing no governmental opposition, as 
they have during the Obama and Trump administrations in order to fight this ideological 
and operational threat.  
3. Yemen is an exceedingly interesting case because it is perhaps one of the only countries 
in which an Al Qaeda affiliate currently dominates in the competition with the Islamic 
                                                




State’s Yemen wilayat. Although it may have been overshadowed by the Islamic State’s 
surge of brutal media and creation of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria, Al Qaeda is not dead. 
Rather, it seems to live on in the enduring existence of its associations and affiliates in 
the Arabian Peninsula, Indian Subcontinent, Somalia (al-Shabab), Pakistan, Libya, and 
Egypt. A closer look at these groups, especially following the fall of the physical Islamic 
State, is needed.  
4. While AQAP’s propaganda lacks the Islamic State’s “Hollywood” aesthetic, it still has 
retained the upper hand in Yemen over IS in recruitment and appeasement of locals. In 
this case, it is not the quality of propaganda that has succeeded, but the visual strategies 
that ensure local appeal. This propaganda may be recognizably lower quality to the 
viewer’s eye, but it cannot be discounted – particularly not in the case of Yemen where 
local appeal and access to resources seem to trump all else. Yemen’s severely limited 3G 
network renders the quality of propaganda viewed in the country less of a factor in its 
efficacy. In any case, it is important not to be blinded by the impressive visual quality of 
the Islamic State, as this alone does not ensure the media’s ability to persuade.  
5. This survey of propaganda shows preliminary signs that AQAP has begun to mimic the 
visual narratives used in Islamic State and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham videos. AQAP’s visual 
adoption of modern techniques such as the video game aesthetic signifies the growing 
development of its media. AQAP, and possibly other Al Qaeda affiliates, is changing and 
adapting its propaganda to retain its relevancy and appeal to a modern, technology-savvy 
audience. More research relating to the causal relationship between the Islamic State and 




6. Finally, there is such a gaping hole in the study of AQAP propaganda outside the realm 
of Inspire. We cannot begin to understand and know how to counter this dangerous 
affiliate’s influence without a broader understanding of it and its media output. This study 
demonstrates how absolutely imperative it is to consider local context and culture when 
studying jihadist propaganda. The efficacy of media production quality in Yemen could 
not have been determined without investigating the country’s limited 3G network. One 
cannot understand AQAP propaganda to its full capacity without understanding the 
historical and cultural grievances it exploits. In short, context matters; propaganda cannot 
be studied in isolation from the audience who will be viewing it.  
Limitations 
 Thirty-two videos can only show us so much about AQAP propaganda. A broader survey 
of videos (given more time) would allow for a much more holistic view of trends in audience and 
propaganda. Given the limits of this survey, important videos or trends in AQAP’s propaganda 
may well have been missed. The AQAP video celebrating the Pensacola shooting would not 
have been discovered as a counterargument had the author not continued to monitor AQAP’s 
video production past February 2020.428 Similarly, the outsourcing of the espionage video from 
2020 would not have been discovered without the matching of the video to a short discussion of 
the series’ first video in 2018 provided in Kendall’s article.429  
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 Additionally, the lag time in between the posting of the videos from an AQAP source, 
Aaron Zelin’s discovery of the video, and his own posting of the video make chronological 
conclusions about AQAP’s propaganda difficult to verify. However, the author has attempted to 
mitigate this by observing very general, year-by-year trends. It remains true that investigating the 
audio and textual evidence alongside the imagery in videos would lend the viewer a greater 
impression of AQAP’s videos’ aims and purpose. Arabic translation of these videos would be 
undoubtedly useful in their analysis.  
Future Research  
 This study has prompted a multitude of questions and future research recommendations 
that could paint a greater picture AQAP and its propaganda strategy. Naturally, a more 
comprehensive study of AQAP videos would offer more information as to additional categories 
and trends in the group’s media. A holistic investigation of AQAP’s media that includes its 
nashids and online documents (and therefore online issues of Inspire) might lend a more 
informative look at the breakdown of AQAP media tailored to a Western versus a domestic 
audience. This study’s counterarguments and brief discussion of Anwar al-Awlaki also make 
clear the need for a deeper investigation of his enduring postmortem influence and ability to 
radicalize and inspire attacks against the West.   
 The ongoing competition in Yemen between AQAP and ISY prompts an interest in a 
comparative study of the two groups’ propaganda, particularly given the inability of the Islamic 
State to take hold in Yemen. This study would lend a greater view as to what media strategies 
AQAP has used to successfully edge out ISY for recruits and influence in Yemen. It would be 
extremely interesting to compare the quality and visuals of AQAP media before and after the 




video quality or adopted new visual narratives (like the video game aesthetic) in response to ISY 
and its own video production.  
 It is also extremely important to investigate Ansar al-Sharia as an insurgent phenomenon 
beyond Yemen and into northern Africa. While an initial investigation into these groups 
establishes no coherent connection beyond their name, goal to promote Islamic law, and interest 
in public service, comparing the groups’ tactics and propaganda strategies might be extremely 
useful in understanding and seeking to counter these jihadist groups. Aaron Zelin’s research has 
focused on Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia (AST), a group that paired “community service” with its 
religious and violent aims to exert its influence in Tunisia.430 While previously loyal to Al 
Qaeda, AST swore loyalty to the Islamic State before being disbanded in 2015.431 Ansar al-
Shariah in Libya, previously infamous for its involvement in the 2012 attack on the U.S. 
Consulate in Benghazi, “promoted itself as a charitable public service organization,” before it 
disbanded in May 2017.432 The group denied any alignment to Al Qaeda, though it seems to have 
supported it in statements.433 Foreign Policy reports that there were additional Ansar al-Sharia 
groups supporting Al Qaeda in Morocco and Egypt, although both seem to have been dismantled 
by their country’s government in 2012 and 2014, respectively.434 It is important to note that 
AQAP’s Ansar al-Sharia is the only group that has survived into 2020.   
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Recommendations and Lessons Learned  
 Having completed this research project, the author offers these observations and 
recommendations:  
1. It is clear that AQAP aspires to threaten the United States homeland once again, whether 
it has the capacity for an attack emanating out of Yemen or not. Denying AQAP 
influence in Yemen is perhaps the best way to prevent that threat from returning. 
2. Drone strikes have not succeeded in eliminating AQAP in Yemen. While they may have 
decapitated AQAP’s leadership, the group returns with new leaders and new propaganda 
strategies to exert its influence (i.e. the turn towards competition with the Islamic State in 
AQAP propaganda following the increase of drone strikes in 2017). Using this local 
understanding of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its goals, the United States must 
adapt to the transforming threat of AQAP and begin to formulate a counterterrorism 
strategy in Yemen that does not play to AQAP’s advantage. While the American drone 
policy in Yemen has enjoyed a degree of success in weakening AQAP, drones are not 
capable of retaking territory, and the United States has no strong counterinsurgent force 
in Yemen to support in the fight against AQAP as it did in 2012. If the United States 
continues only to conduct drone strikes, it risks further alienating the entire Yemeni 
population into the open arms of AQAP.  
3. The enduring conflict of the civil war provides a lawless atmosphere and leaves the 
population increasingly vulnerable population in ways that AQAP can exploit. The 
coalition’s announcement of a two-week ceasefire in April 2020 amid the concern of 
COVID-19 is a step in the right direction, although the violence has continued despite it 
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(and despite other UN-brokered ceasefires). 435 This does not inspire confidence in a 
lasting resolution. However, a peaceful resolution and the subsequent formation of a new 
government would likely best undermine AQAP’s influence and discredit its message 
that it is more capable a ruler than the government itself. If this government is formed 
with particular attention to the south’s historic aims at secession and ensures the proper 
representation of all regions in Yemen, AQAP’s attempts to play on the population’s 
wide distrust of the government will shatter.  
4. AQAP will continue to cling to power in its historic strongholds aligned with specific 
tribes. The best hope to once again take back AQAP’s territory, as President Hadi 
accomplished in 2012, is to establish a strong government in Yemen that can launch an 
internal military offensive against the group. Ideally, Yemen would develop a cohesive 
military undivided by political allegiances and capable of maintaining the Yemeni 
government’s territorial sovereignty, thereby removing the anti-American sentiment 
AQAP capitalizes on.   
5. The Yemeni people are not inherently biased towards siding with AQAP. They likely 
remember AQAP’s brutal rule in 2011-2012. However, the desperation of civil war 
conditions force civilians to seek resources where they can find them and side with those 
who will protect them. AQAP will continue to play on this vulnerability and showcase its 
public services and resources until it no longer works.  
6. The United States might consider fighting AQAP’s influence with its own strategy, 
attempting to use soft power in lieu of the hard power to which Yemen has become 
accustomed in order to win the hearts and minds of the Yemeni people while 
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simultaneously providing them humanitarian relief. This soft power could be used by the 
United States to counter AQAP’s fueling of anti-American sentiment and render AQAP’s 
public service propaganda category less effective when conditions are safe for aid 
workers to operate in Yemen. This would require a massive pledge of foreign aid 
assistance from the United States, and would be reliant on the effectiveness of 
organizations like the U.S. Agency for International Development. In the words of 
Senator John Kerry, who spoke to the Committee on Foreign Relations on the situation in 
Yemen in 2010, “It remains to be seen whether the United States is willing to make the 
commitment necessary in resources and effort in patience in order to address these kinds 
of challenges.”436   
7. Lastly, the United States’ actions in Yemen at present will always be tainted by its killing 
of civilians by drone strikes and support of the Saudi-led coalition, which has committed 
war crimes in Yemen. The US must consider reforming its foreign policy towards Yemen 
if it intends to make progress in this complex international conflict. However, it should be 
noted that this cannot, and should not, be an American responsibility. The response to the 
civil war and its humanitarian crisis should be an international effort.  
 This paper does not argue that either Al Qaeda, nor its affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula, 
is becoming a credible international terrorist threat to the West or the United States homeland. In 
fact, the Obama and Trump Administrations’ aggressive counterterrorism policy in Yemen has 
noticeably diminished AQAP’s leadership structure, propaganda, and capability to strike the 
West.437 The threat of terrorism does not dominate national security policy as it once did, nor 
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does it shape the daily lives of American citizens as it did in the aftermath of September 11, 
2001.438 However, the investigation of this dataset of AQAP propaganda indicates AQAP’s 
adoption of a locally-based strategy to survive and grow in influence. AQAP has once again 
diverged from Al Qaeda senior leadership’s goals, taking advantage of Yemen’s failed state 
status and seizing territory to rule under Sharia law. It succeeded in retaking many of the 
southern provinces it held in the chaos of Yemen’s political upheaval in 2011-2012 and still 
holds swathes of territory in Yemen’s southern governorates unchallenged by the Yemeni 
government. Though its heads may be cut off, like the hydra, AQAP returns, adapting and 
evolving as a dangerous threat to Yemen’s already vulnerable population.    
       
  
                                                







Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith. “Al-Qaida’s Wretched Utopia and the Battle for Hearts and Minds.” The  
Guardian. April 30, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/30/alqaida-
yemen-jihadis-sharia-law.  
 




Al-Haj, Ahmed. “Yemen says More Than 2,000 Killed in Uprising.” The Washington Post.  
March 18, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-says-more-
than-2000-killed-in-uprising/2012/03/18/gIQAGOtcLS_story.html.   
 
“Al-Malahim Media Presents a New Video Message from al-Qa’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s  
Anwar al-Awlaqi: Concepts #4 “The Culture of Martyrdom.” Jihadology.net. June 12, 








5b8eLbq1w_vvtfJQW9TkGxWH1KvaQ4vQ5w. (3:24).  
 
Almasmari, Hakim. “Interview of Ahmed Al-Bahri: Expert in Houthi Affairs.” Yemen Post.  
April 10, 2010. 
http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1723&MainCat=4. 
 




Al-Shishani, Murad Batal. “Ibrahim al-Rubaish: New Religious Ideologue of al-Qaeda in Saudi  
Arabia Calls for Revival of Assassination Tactic.” Terrorism Monitor 7, no. 36 
(November 25, 2009). https://jamestown.org/program/ibrahim-al-rubaish-new-religious-
ideologue-of-al-qaeda-in-saudi-arabia-calls-for-revival-of-assassination-tactic-2/.  
 
Amnesty International. Conflict in Yemen: Abyan’s Darkest Hour. London: Amnesty  
 International Ltd, 2012.  
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/mde310102012en.pdf.  
 
Amnesty International. “Yemen War: No End in Sight.” Amnesty International. March 14, 2019.  





“Anwar al-Awlaki.” Counter Extremism Project.  
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/anwar-al-awlaki. 
 
“Anwar al-Awlaki’s Ties to Extremism.” Counter Counter Extremism Project.  
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/anwar-al-awlaki. 
 
Arrabyee, Nasser. “Rising Extremism in Yemen.” Carnegie Middle East Center. February 19,  
 2016. https://carnegie-mec.org/sada/62832.  
 
Atwan, Abdel Bari. After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation. New York: The New Press,  
 2013.  
 
Baken, Denise N. and Ioannis Mantzikos. “Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” In Al  
 Qaeda: the transformation of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa. Santa  
 Barbara, California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015.  
 
Baron, Adam. “The Gulf Country That Will Shape the Future of Yemen.” The Atlantic.  
September 22, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/yemen-
mukalla-uae-al-qaeda/570943/. 
 
Bayoumy, Yara, Noah Browning, Mohammed Ghobari. “How Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen has  
 Made al-Qaeda Stronger – and Richer.” Reuters. April 8, 2016. 
 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/. 
 
Bayoumy, Yara and Phil Stewart. “Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons supply to Yemen's Houthis  
via Oman – officials.” Reuters. October 20, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
yemen-security-iran-idUSKCN12K0CX. 
 
Bergen, Peter. United States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorists. New 
 York: Crown Publishers, 2016.  
 
Boyle, Michael J. “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare.” Journal of International  
 Affairs 89, no. 1 (2013): 1-29.  
 
Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict. London:  
 Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017.  
 
Byman, Daniel. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone 
 Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.  
 
Cammann, Schuyler V. R. “Cult of the Jambiya: Dagger Wearing in Yemen.” Penn Museum  
Expedition 19, no. 2 (Winter 1977): 27-34. 
https://www.penn.museum/documents/publications/expedition/PDFs/19-2/Cammann.pdf. 
 




Are Remembered Better Than Static Images When Resources Are Limited.” Visual 
Cognition 23, no. 9-10, 2015: 1205-16. Doi:10.1080/13506285.2016.1159636.    
 
Casale, Giancarlo. The Ottoman Age of Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
 
Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook: Yemen.” Central Intelligence Agency. Last  
Updated March 16, 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ym.html.  
 
Combating Terrorism Center. The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Internet  
Propaganda. West Point, NY: Combatting Terrorism at West Point, March 1, 2006. 
https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/Islamic-Imagery-Project.pdf.  
 
Congressional Research Service. “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.” Congressional  
Research Service. Updated August 24, 2018. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960/29.  
 
Connelly, Mark, Jo Fox, Stefan Goebel, and Ulf Schmidt. Propaganda and Conflict: War, 
 Media, and Shaping the Twentieth Century. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.  
 
Coombs, Casey. “In Yemen, the Internet is a Key Front in the Conflict.” CODA. March 10,  
 2020. https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/yemen-internet-conflict/. 
 
Coombs, Casey L. “Yemen’s Use of Militias to Maintain.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West  
Point 6, no. 2 (February 2013). https://ctc.usma.edu/yemens-use-of-militias-to-maintain-
stability-in-abyan-province/.  
 
“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013.” U.S. Department of State. April 2014.  
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.  
 
Dalton, Melissa, Hijab Shah, and Timothy Robbins. “U.S. Support for Saudi Military Operations  
in Yemen.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. March 23, 2018. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-support-saudi-military-operations-yemen. 
 
Dauber, Cori E. and Mark Robinson. “Guest Post: ISIS and the Hollywood Visual  
Style.” Jihadology.net. July 6, 2015. http://jihadology.net/2015/07/06/guest-post-isis-and-
the-hollywood-visual-style/. 
 
Dauber et al. “Call of Duty: Jihad – How the Video Game Motif Has Migrated Downstream  




Dearden, Lizzie. “Al-Qaeda Leader in Yemen Jalal Baleedi ‘Killed in Drone Strike.’”  






Detenber, Benjamin H. and Robert F. Simons. “Roll ‘Em: The Effects of Picture Motion on  
 Emotional Responses.” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media,” 42, no. 1 (1998):  
 113-127. https://doi.org/10.1080/08838159809364437.  
 
“Digital Developments: Extremists’ Use of Modern Communications Tools.” Counter  




Dresch, Paul. A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.  
 
“Drone Strikes in Yemen.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. September 2019. 
 https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/yemen.  
 
Droogan, Julian and Shane Peattie. “Reading Jihad: Mapping the shifting themes of Inspire 
 magazine.” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 4 (2018): 685-686.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1211527. 
 
el Deeb, Sarah. “Yemen al-Qaida Branch Says Top Cleric Killed in Drone Attack.” AP News.  




Fanusie, Yaya J. and Alex Entz. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Financial Assessment.”  
Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. July 2017. https://s3.us-east-
2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/CSIF_TFBB_AQAP_web.pdf. 
 




“FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich’s Remarks at Press Conference on Naval Air Station  




Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University  
 Press, 2002.  
 
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism, Third Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).  
 
Horton, Michael. “Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula.”  






“How to tie a Shemagh/How to Tie a Yemeni Head Scarf/ How to Wear the Yemeni Shemagh.”  
Youtube.com. July 10, 2018. Posted by Sultan. 
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LeXRZbVb4JU. (2:48).  
 
Hubbard, Ben. “U.S. Fingerprints on Attacks Obliterating Yemen’s Economy.” The New York  




“Ibrahim al-Asiri.” Counter Extremism Project.  
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ibrahim-al-asiri. 
 
International Crisis Group. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base.” Middle East Report No.  
174. International Crisis Group. February 2, 2017. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-the-base.pdf.  
 
Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia. New  
 York: W.W. Norton, 2013.  
 
Joscelyn, Thomas. “Al Qaeda’s Expansion into Egypt.” FDD’s Long War Journal. February 11,  
2014. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php. 
 




Joscelyn, Thomas. “Moroccan Government Dismantled ‘Ansar al Sharia’ Terrorist Cell.” FDD’s  
Long War Journal. November 13, 2012. 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/moroccan_government.php.  
 






Kendall, Elizabeth. “The Failing Islamic State Within the Failed State of Yemen.” Perspectives  
 on Terrorism 13, no. 1 (February 2019): 77-86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26590510. 
 
Khan, Ghazanfar Ali. “Not Just a Checkered Scarf.” Arab News. July 1, 2015.  
 https://www.arabnews.com/fashion/news/769871.  
 
Kirke, Xander. “Violence and Political Myth: Radicalizing Believers in the Pages of Inspire  






Knights, Michael. “The Houthis War Machine: From Guerilla War to State Capture.”  
 Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point Sentinel 11, no. 8 (September 2018).  
 
Lahoud et al. “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?” Combatting Terrorism Center at  
 West Point. West Point, NY: Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3, 2012.  
 
Lemieux, Anthony F., Jarret M. Brachman, Jason Levitt, and Jay Wood. “Inspire Magazine: A  
Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the 
Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model.” Terrorism and Political Violence 
26, no. 2 (2014): 354-371. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.828604.  
 




Mapping Militant Organizations. “Ansar al-Shariah (Libya).” Stanford University. Last modified  
July 2018. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-al-shariah-libya.  
 
Mapping Militant Organizations, “Ansar al-Shariah (Tunisia),” Stanford University, last  
modified August 2018, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-al-
shariah-tunisia#_ftn3. 
 
“Mapping the Yemen Conflict (2015).” European Council on Foreign Relations. 2015.  
https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen_mapping_2015. 
 
Mardini, Ramzy and Bruce O. Riedel. The Battle for Yemen: Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for  
 Stability. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2010.  
 
Masi, Alessandria. “Al Qaeda Winning Hearts and Minds Over ISIS in Yemen with Social  
Services.” International Business Times. April 7, 2016. https://www.ibtimes.com/al-
qaeda-winning-hearts-minds-over-isis-yemen-social-services-2346835. 
 
McEvers, Kelly. “They Tried to Make Mohammed al-Awfi Go to Rehab.” Foreign Policy.  
January 27, 2010. https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/27/they-tried-to-make-mohammed-
al-awfi-go-to-rehab/.  
 
McKernan, Bethan. “Fighting Escalates in Yemen Despite Coronavirus ‘Ceasefire.’” The  
Guardian. April 14, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/14/fighting-
escalates-in-yemen-despite-coronavirus-ceasefire.  
 
Milelli, Jean-Pierre and Gilles Kepel. Al Qaeda in Its Own Words. Translated by Pascale 
 Ghazaleh. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qa’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qasim al-Raymi: ‘And  
Satisfy the Breasts of a Believing People: Blessing and Adoption of the Attack on the 








Niarchos, Nicolas. “How the U.S. is Making the War in Yemen Worse?” The New Yorker.   




O’Neill, Brian. “AQAP: A Rising Threat in Yemen.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point  
 Sentinel 2, no. 4 (April 2009). https://ctc.usma.edu/aqap-a-rising-threat-in-yemen/. 
 
“Press Release: Malnutrition Amongst Children in Yemen at an All-time High, Warns  
UNICEF.” UNICEF. December 12, 2016. https://www.unicef.org/press-
releases/malnutrition-amongst-children-yemen-all-time-high-warns-unicef. 
 
“Qaeda: English: “From Here We Begin…and at Al-Aqsa We Meet.” World Analysis. February  
 19, 2009. http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=212. 
 
“Restoring Electricity for the People of Yemen.” United Nations Office for Project Services.  
April 16, 2018. https://www.unops.org/news-and-stories/news/restoring-electricity-for-
the-people-of-yemen. 
 
Robinson, Mark D. and Cori E. Dauber. “Grading the Quality of ISIS Videos: A Metric for  
Assessing the Technical Sophistication of Digital Video Propaganda.” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 42, no. 1-2 (December 2018): 70-87. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1513693. 
 
Roggio, Bill and Caleb Weiss. “AQAP Details ‘Special Forces’ Training Camp.” FDD’s Long  
War Journal. July 14, 2016. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/aqap-
details-special-forces-training-camp.php.  
 
Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. Regime and Periphery in Northern  
 Yemen: the Houthi Phenomenon. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010.  
 
Schmitt, Eric and David E. Sanger. “Raid in Yemen: Risky From the Start and Costly in the  




Schmitt, Eric and Scott Shane. “Qaeda Plot to Attack Plane Foiled, U.S. Officials Say.” The New  
York Times. May 7, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/world/middleeast/us-
says-terrorist-plot-to-attack-plane-foiled.html.  
 




New York Times. November 5, 2010. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/world/middleeast/06terror.html. 
 
Schreiner, Meagan, Mark A. E. Williams, S. David Zuckerman. “Inspirations and Limitations:  
Reason, the Universal Audience, and Inspire Magazine.” Journal of Communication & 




Shaker, Naseh. “What, no connection? Internet Outage Further Darkens Life in Yemen.” Al- 
Monitor. January 16, 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/01/internet-
victim-of-yemeni-civil-war.html.  
 
Shane, Scott. “In ‘Watershed Moment,’ YouTube Block’s Extremist Cleric’s Message.” The  




Sharp, Jeremy M. “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.” Congressional Research  




Sharp, Jeremy M. Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. Washington, District of  
Columbia: Congressional Research Service, 2019. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf. 
 
“Shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola Called ‘Act of Terrorism.’” Federal Bureau of  
Investigation. January 13, 2020. https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/naval-air-station-
pensacola-shooting-called-act-of-terrorism-011320.  
 
Simons, Robert F. et al. “Attention to Television: Alpha Power and Its Relationship to Image  
 Motion and Emotional Content.” Media Psychology 5 (2003): 283-301.  
 
Skillicorn, D. B. and E. F. Reid. “Language Use in Inspire Magazine.” 2013 IEEE International  
Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics. Seattle, WA (2013): 239-244. 
10.1109/ISI.2013.6578827.  
 
Taylor, Phillip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to  
 the Present Era, Third Edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.  
 
Terrill, W. Andrew. The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian  











The White House. “Statement from the President.” February 6, 2020. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-from-the-president-13/. 
 
Trew, Bel. “Hundreds Killed and Injured by Houthi Landmines in Yemen, as War Death Toll  




United States Congress, Committee on Homeland Security: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism  
 and Intelligence. “Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: al-Qaeda in the Arabian  
 Peninsula (AQAP): Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 
 Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One  
 Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 2, 2011. Washington, District of  




United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. “Yemen: Confronting al-Qaeda,  
Preventing State Failure: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, January 20, 2010.” 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010.  
 




Walsh, Declan. “Al Qaeda Claims It Directed Florida Naval Base Shooting.” The New York  
Times. February 2, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/world/middleeast/al-
qaeda-claims-it-directed-florida-naval-base-shooting.html.  
 
Weiss, Caleb. “AQAP and Islamic State Resume Fighting in Yemen.” FDD’s Long War Journal.  
September 11, 2019. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/09/aqap-and-
islamic-state-resume-fighting-in-yemen.php.  
 
Weiss, Murray. The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O’Neill, the FBI’s  
Embattled Counterterror Warrior. New York: Regan Books, 2003.  
 
“What is the difference between 3G, 4G, and 5G?” Verizon. November 18, 2019.  
 https://www.verizon.com/about/our-company/5g/difference-between-3g-4g-5g. 
 




An Introduction.” Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press and Strategic Studies Institute, 
2014.  
 
Winter, Charlie and Joe Whittaker. “The Islamic State’s Suicide Industry.” Action on Armed  
Violence. October 4, 2017. https://aoav.org.uk/2017/islamic-states-suicide-industry/. 
 
“Yemen Conflict: Al-Qaeda Seen at Coalition Battle for Taiz.” BBC News. February 22, 2016.  
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35630194.  
 




Zeliger, Robert. “A History of Prison Breaks in Yemen.” Foreign Policy. June 22, 2011.  
 https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/22/a-history-of-prison-breaks-in-yemen/. 
 
Zelin, Aaron Y. “About.” Jihadology.net. https://jihadology.net/about/.  
 
Zelin, Aaron. “How Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Message Framing Primed Its Members to  
Become Recruits for the Islamic State.” Global Network on Extremism & Technology. 
March 19, 2020. https://gnet-research.org/2020/03/19/how-ansar-al-sharia-in-tunisias-
message-framing-primed-its-members-to-become-recruits-for-the-islamic-state/. 
 
Zelin, Aaron Y. “Know Your Ansar al-Sharia.” Foreign Policy. September 21, 2012.  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/know-your-ansar-al-sharia/. 
 
Zengerle, Patricia. “Defying Congress, Trump Sets $8 Billion-Plus in Weapons Sales to Saudi  








Appendix 1: Ansar al-Sharia Insurgency Videos 
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘Appeals of the Hūthī  
Prisoners #2.’” Jihadology.net. April 13, 2017. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2017/04/13/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-
in-the-arabian-peninsula-appeals-of-the-%e1%b8%a5uthi-prisoners-2-2/. (5:04).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Dust of the Battles.”  
Jihadology.net. February 22, 2019. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2019/02/22/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-
in-the-arabian-peninsula-dust-of-the-battles/. (23:32).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Explosive Devices  
Upon the Huthi Army.” Jihadology.net. July 18, 2015. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2015/07/18/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-
in-the-arabian-peninsula-explosive-devices-upon-the-%e1%b8%a5uthi-army/. (3:10).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘Inghimasiyya Operation  
Upon the Political Security Building – Wilayat al-Hudaydah.’” Jihadology.net. December 
1, 2015. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2015/12/01/new-video-
message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-inghimasiyyah-
operation-upon-the-political-security-building-wilayat-al-%e1%b8%a5udaydah/. (7:38).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: Liberation of Waqar  
City From the Gangs of Abd al-latif al-Sayyid – Wilayat Abyan.” Jihadology.net. 




“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Military Training Camp  
of the Commander Hamzah al-Zinjubari.’” Jihadology.net. July 13, 2016. Posted by 
Aaron Y. Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2016/07/13/new-video-message-from-
an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-military-training-camp-of-the-
commander-%e1%b8%a5amzah-al-zinjubari/. (35:39).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘Storming the Barracks  
of the Mercenaries of the Security Belt in Shuqrah City.’” Jihadology.net. July 3, 2017. 
Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2017/07/03/new-video-message-from-
an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-storming-the-barracks-of-the-
mercenaries-of-the-security-belt-in-shuqrah-city/. (7:03).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘The Battle of al-Jih- 







Appendix 2: Local Public Services Videos 
 
“New video message from al-Nūr Media Center: ‘The Gate of Glory.’” Jihadology.net.  
October 27, 2017. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2017/10/27/new-
video-message-from-al-nur-media-center-the-gate-of-glory/. (20:30).  
 
“New Video Message from from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘Aid and  
Services Project at the Ibn Sīnā Hospital in the City of al-Mukallā – Wilāyat 
Hadrawmawt.’” Jihadology.net. March 1, 2016. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2016/03/01/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-
in-the-arabian-peninsula-aid-and-services-project-at-the-ibn-sina-hospital-in-the-city-of-
al-mukalla-wilayat-%e1%b8%a5a%e1%b8%8dramawt/. (5:09).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: Aspects of Fixing  
the Public Electricity Lines.’” Jihadology.net. January 26, 2016. Posted by Aaron Y. 
Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2016/01/26/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-
shariah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-aspects-of-fixing-the-public-electricity-lines/. (3:34).  
 
“New Message from Ansar al-Shari-ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘Aspects of the Coverage of  
the Hurricane in Wilayat Hadramawt.’” Jihadology.net. December 16, 2015. Posted by 




“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘Coverage of Efforts  
in the Distribution of Food Baskets.’” Jihadology.net. February 1, 2016. Posted by Aaron 
Y. Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2016/02/01/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-
al-shariah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-coverage-of-efforts-in-the-distribution-of-food-
baskets/. (4:41).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansar al-Shari-ah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘Providing  
Assistance and Aid for Fishermen Affected by the Hurricane – Wilayat Hadramawt.’” 
Jihadology.net. December 23, 2015. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2015/12/23/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-shariah-
in-the-arabian-peninsula-providing-assistance-and-aid-for-fishermen-affected-by-the-






Appendix 3: Recorded Sermon Videos 
 
“Al-Malāhim Media Presents a New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian  
Peninsula’s Shaykh Ibrāhīm bin Sulaymān al-Rubaysh: ‘The Role of Women in Jihād.’” 
Jihadology.net. August 2, 2015. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2015/08/02/al-mala%e1%b8%a5im-media-presents-a-new-video-
message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsulas-shaykh-ibrahim-bin-sulayman-al-
rubaysh-the-role-of-women-in-jihad/. (25:33).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Hārith bin Ghāzī al-Nazārī  
[Muhammad al-Mirshadī]: ‘Da’wah Series: With the Qur’an #9: Until There is No More 
Discord.’” Jihadology.net. May 28, 2017. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2017/05/28/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-
peninsulas-harith-bin-ghazi-al-na%e1%ba%93ari-mu%e1%b8%a5ammad-al-mirshadi-
dawah-series-with-the-quran/. (11:53).  
 
New Video Message from from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Ibrāhīm al- 
Qūsī (Khubayb al-Sudani): ‘Congratulating the Solid Edifice.’”  Jihadology.net. 
December 12, 2015. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2015/12/12/new-
video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsulas-shaykh-ibrahim-al-
qu%e1%b9%a3i-khubayb-al-sudani-the-blessed-solid-edifice/. (7:46).  
 
“New Video Message from from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Ibrāhīm al- 
Qūsī (Khubayb al-Sudani): ‘Somalia: Harvest of Patience and Persistence.’” 
Jihadology.net. February 25, 2016. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2016/02/25/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-
peninsulas-shaykh-ibrahim-al-qu%e1%b9%a3i-khubayb-al-sudani-somalia-harvest-of-
patience-and-persistence/. (8:42).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Ibrāhīm bin  
Sulaymān al-Rubaysh: ‘From the Series: Correction of the Errors #1.’” Jihadology.net. 












BXd_0F8VfK6EeY4auHgG_SFe81m. (19:16).  
 




Bātarfī’ (Abu al-Miqdād al-Kindī): ‘Stances from the Stories of the Prophets #6: 











XrO2wlRbuRcGupyDrXOqpXDk. (7:49).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Khālid bin Umar  
Batarfi (Abu al-Miqda al Kanadi): ‘The House of Sa’ud: Beginning of the Fall.’” 
Jihadology.net. January 18, 2016. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2016/01/18/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-
peninsulas-shaykh-khalid-bin-umar-ba%e1%b9%adarfi-abu-al-miqdad-al-kanadi-the-
house-of-saud-beginning-of-the-fall/. (18:46).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Khālid bin Umar  
Batarfi (Abu al-Miqda al Kanadi): ‘Towards Correct Consciousness #6.’” Jihadology.net. 
February 10, 2016. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2016/02/10/new-
video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsulas-shaykh-khalid-bin-umar-
ba%e1%b9%adarfi-abu-al-miqdad-al-kanadi-towards-correct-consciousness-6/. (7:59).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shakh Qāsim al-Raymī:  
‘Explanation of the Book: Summary of War Politics’ by al-Harthamī, Fifth Lesson.” 
Jihadology.net. December 12, 2017. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2017/12/12/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-
peninsulas-shaykh-qasim-al-raymi-explanation-of-the-book-summary-of-war-politics-by-
al-harthami-fifth-le/. (7:22).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī:  
‘Explanation of the Book: “Summary of War Politics” By al-Harthamī, Nineteenth 
Lesson.” Jihadology.net. January 9, 2018. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2018/01/09/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-
peninsulas-shaykh-qasim-al-raymi-explanation-of-the-book-summary-of-war-politics-by-
al-harthami-nineteen/. (6:03).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī:  
‘Explanation of the Book: “Summary of War Politics” By al-Harthamī, Sixteenth 








“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī:  
‘Explanation of the Book: “Summary of War Politics” By al-Harthamī, Thirteenth 





“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī:  
‘Explanation of the Book: “Summary of War Politics” By al-Harthamī, Twenty-Fifth 














“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī:  
‘Explanation of the Book: “Summary of War Politics” By al-Harthamī, Twenty-Second 










Appendix 4: Competition with ISY Videos   
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: ‘God Testifies That They Are  
Liars #2.’” Jihadology.net. December 22, 2018. Posted Aaron Y. Zelin. 
https://jihadology.net/2018/12/22/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-
peninsula-god-testifies-that-they-are-liars-2/. (3:17).  
 
“New Video Message from Ansār al-Sharī’ah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Testimonies for the  
Prisoners from the State Organization.” Jihadology.net. August 8, 2018. Posted Aaron Y. 
Zelin. https://jihadology.net/2018/08/08/new-video-message-from-an%e1%b9%a3ar-al-
shariah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-testimonies-for-the-prisoners-from-the-state-
organization/. (8:00).  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: “The Hollywood Reality of al- 
Baghdādī’s Group #2.” Jihadology.net. August 11, 2019. 
https://jihadology.net/2019/08/11/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-






Appendix 5: Espionage Videos  
 
“New Video Message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Demolishing of the Espionage  
#4: So Will They Not Repent to God.” Jihadology.net. February 25, 2020.  
https://jihadology.net/2020/02/25/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-
peninsula-demolishing-of-the-espionage-4-so-will-they-not-repent-to-god/. (1:03:53).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
